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I. Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between the partisan composition of state 
governments and healthcare in that state. It first shows the theoretical conditions which impact 
taxation and healthcare spending policies. This theory supports the notion that divided 
governments produce better healthcare outcomes for individuals than unified state governments. 
These theoretical conditions are then tested empirically in four iterations. The first iteration 
considers the direct relationships posited by the theoretical model as stand-alone equations. The 
second iteration adds variables designed to control for demographic and economic conditions in 
each state and evaluates the impact of a state’s decision to expand Medicaid. The third iteration 
of these relationships is a simultaneous estimation of the first iteration. Simultaneous estimation 
addresses the existence of several variables as both dependent variables in certain equations and 
independent variables in others. The fourth iteration simultaneously estimates the relationships 
with the inclusion of state level control variables and an analysis of whether or not a state chose 
to expand Medicaid. The theoretical results suggest that health outcomes can be altered on a 
short time horizon by state governments through policy. However, this assertion fails to hold up 
when properly modeled and the results suggest that state governments do not have a discernable 
effect on the health outcomes of their citizens on Medicaid. The only finding of the theoretical 
model that holds up to rigorous econometric examination is that government complexion 
significantly impacts the tax rate in a state as unified state governments increase taxes in the 
states they control. 
II. Introduction, Background Information, Motivation and Contribution 
This research examines the effect of the partisan complexion of state governments upon 
taxation and the compounded impact of those two features upon state level Medicaid allocations  
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from 2000-2014. Ultimately, this research focuses on health outcomes for Medicaid enrollees as 
determined by the taxation and health policies of state governments. The political complexion is 
also crucial in determining the extent of healthcare coverage in each state. Healthcare coverage 
refers to the Medicaid program in each state. From state level healthcare spending and coverage 
under Medicaid, this research will then examine the effect on individuals on Medicaid in terms 
of their health outcomes. 
A key motivating factor for this study was the fact that the topic of income inequality has 
increasingly permeated American politics in both parties. Correspondingly, income inequality 
has emerged as an economic topic of study. At each stage of this discussion, the focus has been 
on the federal government’s power to either correct or unintentionally exacerbate income 
inequality through various actions, particularly tax policy and spending on various programs. 
This focus on the federal government has overlooked the role of state governments. This paper 
sets up a framework to review and then examine the effects of the complexion of state 
governments on health outcomes within the state. Income inequality is not examined as an 
explicit portion of the relationships between political complexion and health outcomes, but it 
does feature in the models when accounting for the conditions in each state. 
Republicans and Democrats have each talked about income inequality as a pressing 
national issue throughout the past few years. At the same time, the federal government has been 
divided and enacted very few policies. With that as a backdrop, state governments have been 
incredibly active over the past few years, passing far more legislation that the federal 
government.1,2 As such, I wanted to explore how states have approached inequality since the year 
                                                     
1 Govtrack. (2017)  
2 Wilson, R. (2014) 
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2000. This research evolved from that initial desire and quickly incorporated healthcare as the 
principal lens through which to analyze this topic. From there it was quickly obvious that 
examining Medicaid and various factors relating to Medicaid would both be a unique topic, but 
also highlight how a state government could make specific choices relating to the healthcare 
outcomes of its citizens and whether or not this changed in states with different levels of income 
inequality.  
This paper focuses on healthcare coverage and health outcomes. This is due to the fact 
that states can set their own policies on healthcare through the Medicaid program. In the United 
States, the federal government sets a great deal of the health policy, but cedes the states a great 
deal of flexibility in how to structure their Medicaid programs within each state. Medicaid is a 
public insurance program which covers the healthcare of poor citizens in the United States. 
Medicaid eligibility is determined on a state—by—state basis, with some baseline requirements 
for eligibility determined by the federal government. These requirements are both income-based 
and condition-based. All children through age 18 in families with an income below 138% of the 
federal poverty line, pregnant women with income at or below 138% of the federal poverty line, 
and some seniors and disabled people are eligible for the program. States have a great deal of 
freedom in determining whom else they choose to cover under the Medicaid program. Under the 
Affordable Care Act, some states have expanded Medicaid to cover all adults with incomes up to 
138% of the federal poverty line and have adopted other changes to increase eligibility. Other 
states have declined to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act which highlights the 
drastic impact that a state government can have on Medicaid in the state. The variation in 
standards across the nation highlights how state governments can impact healthcare in their state 
through their policy on Medicaid. Further, states have a large amount of freedom when deciding 
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which services to cover under the Medicaid program, which further highlights the importance of 
state governments in determining healthcare across the nation.3 
To further break down and analyze how each state’s decisions and preferences impact the 
Medicaid program in each state, the states Alabama, California and North Carolina will be 
considered as case studies. Each of these states has taken a different approach to Medicaid and 
these approaches outline how different each state’s program can be. Alabama has a simple 
structure for eligibility and benefits. In Alabama, the state government declined to expand 
Medicaid and as such not many people are eligible for the service. In Alabama, those on 
Medicaid are children in families with income up to 141% of the federal poverty line, pregnant 
women with incomes up to 141% of the poverty line and parents with incomes up to 13% of the 
federal poverty line.4 Further, individuals with incomes that do not exceed $755 per month 
($1,123 for a couple) are eligible for Medicaid in Alabama if they are 65 or older, blind or 
disabled.5 Within its Medicaid program, Alabama imposes strict caps on the number of times a 
year that an individual can receive health services. The program limits enrollees to 14 doctor 
visits each calendar year and three outpatient hospital visits. Another quota embedded in the 
program is the cap on eye care services stating that enrollees can only have eye exams and eye 
glasses covered once every three years. The state’s program also features multiple differences in 
services covered depending on the age of the enrollee. For instance, dental services are only 
covered for enrollees under the age of 21 and psychiatric hospital services are available to 
enrollees under the age of 21 and over the age of 65.6 Each facet of Alabama’s Medicaid 
program is determined by the state government. The eligibility thresholds are set by the state 
                                                     
3 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. (2017) 
4 HealthInsurance.org. (2017). “Alabama Medicaid” 
5 State of Alabama. (2017). “Medicaid Income Limits for 2017” 
6 State of Alabama. (2017). “Alabama Medicaid Covered Services and Co-payments” 
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government as are the services covered and for which enrollees those services are provided. The 
program in Alabama is not restarted each year anew, rather it is augmented gradually over the 
time period. This paper will theorize that the change in the government complexion in the state 
over the time horizon of 2000-2014 will alter the state’s Medicaid program and these changes 
have observable consequences on taxation, the size of the state’s Medicaid subsidy, Medicaid 
coverage, and health of their Medicaid enrollees. 
The state of California faces similar choices to the state of Alabama when deciding how 
to construct its Medicaid program but has made radically different decisions as to how to 
structure it. In California those eligible for Medicaid are children from birth through age 18 with 
family incomes of up to 266% of the federal poverty line, pregnant women with incomes up to 
213% of the federal poverty line, and adults with or without children with incomes up to 138% 
of the federal poverty line. These eligibility requirements are markedly different from the 
requirements in Alabama with the most notable difference being the fact that Alabama limits 
eligibility among nonelderly adults to those with incomes less than or equal to 13% of the federal 
poverty line for parents while California allows all adults independent of their parental status to 
enroll in the program if their income is less than or equal to 138% of the federal poverty line.7 
The differences in eligibility standards come directly from decisions that the state government of 
California has made. The state government, influenced by partisan complexion, chose to adopt 
these eligibility standards as well as to accept a mostly federally funded expansion of Medicaid. 
The benefits of Medicaid in California are also significantly different than those in Alabama. In 
California enrollees have access to a generous set of services as medically necessary without the 
quotas seen in Alabama. California covers all medically necessary physician services including 
                                                     
7 HealthInsurance.org. (2017). “California Medicaid” 
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inpatient and outpatient care. Furthermore, the state covers all hospitalization services with no 
annual limit on services provided including any necessary organ and tissue transplantation 
services. In an additional clear contrast to Alabama’s program California provides dental benefits 
to all enrollees ranging from basic preventative care to emergency dental services to dentures 
while Alabama refrained from offering such services to enrollees. California also offers eye 
exams once every two years as opposed to Alabama offering those services every three years.8 
Once again, the state’s decisions have a clear impact on the construction of the Medicaid 
program. California has opted to extend a far more generous benefits package to its Medicaid 
participants and its participants face much more generous admissions criteria. In determining 
both eligibility criteria and benefits offered, the state government of California has made very 
different choices compared to the state of Alabama.  
The final state whose Medicaid program will be considered as a case study is North 
Carolina. As a student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the decisions of the 
state government of North Carolina are of particular interest to me. North Carolina, as in 
Alabama, opted to decline to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act. The state of North 
Carolina has confined Medicaid eligibility to the blind, aged, disabled, parents with dependent 
children with household incomes up to 45% of the federal poverty line, children with family 
incomes less than or equal to 211% of the federal poverty line, and pregnant women with 
incomes up to 196% of the federal poverty line.9 These standards are more restrictive than 
California but more generous than the standards for eligibility in Alabama. This intermediate 
standard of eligibility highlights the fact that states face a clear choice when setting eligibility 
guidelines. States have a whole spectrum of eligibility options available to them when they set 
                                                     
8 California Department of Healthcare Services. (2017) 
9 HealthInsurance.org. (2017). “North Carolina Medicaid” 
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eligibility guidelines. The eligibility criteria a state chooses to set are decisions that each state 
government must make when structuring their Medicaid program.  
North Carolina has a benefits system that is very similar to the Alabama program. In 
North Carolina, benefits are tied to age, income, and health status (blind, disabled, etc.). The 
Medicaid benefits that a person is entitled to are not universal like in California; instead, 
depending on where on the spectrum of eligibility an individual is, their benefits change with 
their individual status and characteristics. An illustrative example of this phenomenon is once 
again seen in the dental benefits that a person receives. In North Carolina, Medicaid only covers 
dental care for children under the age of 21.10 The coverage under Medicaid in North Carolina is 
more conservative on benefits, and is much more similar to Alabama’s system than California’s. 
However, the state has elected to adopt more generous admissions criteria than Alabama which 
showcases the fact that even though states can have similar benefits covered by their Medicaid 
programs, their decisions on who is covered by Medicaid are equally important to the actual 
benefits offered. These decisions on eligibility and benefits offer clear points of contrast between 
the states which this study theorizes results in empirically observed relationships between 
government complexion and a host of other factors related to Medicaid in the states.  
These states not only differ in the benefits that they offer to their Medicaid enrollees, but 
also in their government complexions over the course of the sample, the years 2000-2014. Each 
state experiences both divided and unified state government during the sample period. The three 
figures below display how this study will treat government complexion. 
Figures 2.1-2.3: 
                                                     
10 State of North Carolina. (2017) 
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Note: These figures highlight how the partisan complexion of each state over time. This is a dummy variable, a 
value of 1 represents a unified government while 0 represents a divided government.   
 
The partisan complexion of each state government is a dummy variable. Therefore, in the 
above figures, the years with a value of one are the years where the state has a unified 
government while the times with a divided government are represented with a value of zero. It 
should also be noted that while these three states which are examined in this Medicaid case study 
all have graphs of a similar shape, there is a much wider amount of variety when the entire 
nation is examined later in this paper. The figures show that Alabama has a divided government 
the most frequently, during 60% of the sample. California has unified government slightly more 
frequently, 53.3% of the time, the state has a unified government. North Carolina rarely has a 
divided government during the sample period, with a unified government occurring 86.6% of the 
time. This research therefore looks at how government complexion can act as a driving force 
behind the health outcomes and coverage of its citizens through the policy choices of a state with 
a focus on the decisions the state makes on healthcare spending and taxation. This research 
attempts to explore the outcomes of that flexibility to determine if partisan government 
complexion has any impact on healthcare coverage and outcomes for a state’s citizens. 
This research is a fairly unique contribution to existing literature. To date, there have 
been no significant examinations of state level policies on healthcare outcomes. Most economic 
analysis looks at national or county level statistics. By pursuing this type of research, state 
0
1
Figure 2.3: Partisan 
Complexion of North 
Carolina Over Time
0
1
Figure 2.1: Partisan 
Complexion of Alabama 
Over Time
0
1
Figure 2.2: Partisan 
Complexion of California 
Over Time
10 
 
government choices are typically neglected. Medicaid is another frequently researched topic, but 
typically this research focuses on the idiosyncrasies of the program and its effects on various 
individuals. There is also a significant amount of research devoted to how Medicaid works in 
individual states. However, there is much less research on Medicaid coverage across states. 
There is a further dearth of research on political complexion. Political complexion of state 
legislatures is primarily studied in political science rather than in economics. Even then, it is 
rarely used as an independent variable, but rather a dependent variable. This research is therefore 
unique on several fronts, filling in gaps by providing a framework for how to investigate state 
level effects on the health outcomes of its citizens. This is also a new application of data from the 
Centers of Medicare and Medicaid as well as the Current Population Survey. The remainder of 
this paper will proceed in six parts, a literature review, thesis and theoretical model, empirical 
model, results and analysis, conclusion and bibliography. There is also an appendix containing 
data tables and equations mentioned in the text. 
III. Literature Review 
“North Carolina’s Employment Record: What role did Unemployment Insurance Reform 
play?” and “Poverty in North Carolina since 2000: Structural and Cyclical Components” by Dr. 
Patrick Conway are two of the few examples in current literature of state level studies of policy. 
Each of these papers deal with factors which features prominently in this research; though not 
directly, they establish analytical frameworks which are useful for this analysis. North 
Carolina’s Employment Record looks at the effect of state level policy decisions on individuals, 
a key component of this research. Poverty in North Carolina looks at a single state, North 
Carolina, at the county level. This is different than the analysis in this study as this study 
examines multiple states at the state level. Nevertheless, this paper solidified my interest in state 
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level poverty and provided an important framework for looking at the poverty component of this 
analysis. 
The implications of state partisan composition are explored in Robert Jay Dilger’s 1998 
paper “Does Politics Matter? Partisanship’s Impact on State Spending and Taxes, 1985-95”. 
This analysis covers a time period significantly before the timeframe examined in this study, but 
this paper is an important examination of partisan composition. The critical finding of this paper 
is the fact that economic factors control state spending and that partisan complexion of states did 
not have a significant impact on most levels of spending. This paper looked at data from 1985-
1995 and looked explicitly at political affiliation rather than the question of unified versus 
divided government. Furthermore, the paper looked specifically at education in terms of 
spending and separated the governorship from the state legislature when looking at complexion. 
My research, significantly differs in those aspects from the Dilger paper. The most important 
difference between that analysis and the research presented in this paper is the fact that Dilger’s 
research was conducted from 1985-1995. Since then, the political ideology of the country has 
shifted substantially. Additionally, the Medicaid program did not exist at the state level when 
Dilger wrote his analysis. This paper will almost exclusively focus on Medicaid and therefore 
has substantially different points of emphasis. 
A paper with more saliency for the research itself is Philip Armour, Richard Burkhauser, 
and Jeff Larrimore’s "Deconstructing Income and Income Inequality Measures: A Crosswalk 
from Market Income to Comprehensive Income." This paper explores contemporary methods of 
measuring income inequality in economic analysis. The authors state that most high quality 
economics research done in the field of income inequality utilizes only rudimentary sources of 
income such as cash payments from employment. The authors argue that it is important to 
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include alternative sources of income in analysis of income inequality. The authors believe that 
when alternative sources of income are included in analysis, the observed level of income 
inequality changes significantly. This belief is reinforced by empirical analysis. The authors 
reexamine income datasets and include capital gains as a source of income. Specifically, they 
include a nuanced measure of capital gains which also takes into account an increase in property 
values and tax—sheltered accounts. When these alternative measures of income are added to an 
analysis of income inequality, the authors show that the distance between the highest earners in 
society and the middle class decreases. This finding is contrary to most economic research which 
suggests that the gap between the middle class and upper classes is, in fact, widening. Armour’s 
and his coauthors’ work holds significance for this research as it explores alternative sources of 
income for the poor and even discusses government welfare programs as a potential source of 
alternative income when examining income inequality. The paper also details the fact that 
Medicaid is a powerful alternative source of income for society’s lowest earners. This finding is 
very important for the theory presented in section four. In the theoretical model Medicaid 
subsidies from the state impact the individual’s budget constraint and in the state model, the 
subsidy appears as a direct income transfer to individuals. This also results in a slightly different 
construction of income inequality in the empirical model. A standard computation of a state’s 
Gini coefficient would examine individuals’ total income, but the empirical model presented 
later will feature a modified calculation of a state’s Gini coefficient by examining the sum of 
individuals’ total income and their Medicaid income to produce a slightly different Gini 
coefficient. The Armour et al. paper also informs the analysis by highlighting how welfare 
programs have a broad impact on individuals beyond the defined scope of the program itself. As 
it relates to the empirical relationship explored in later sections, this paper was a key component 
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of the determination of some of the independent variables. When modeling the state’s welfare, 
the size of the Medicaid subsidy and percent of the population of the state below the poverty line 
are each crucial independent variables. This paper provided the framework for including these in 
the model since the paper explored how they impact the well-being of a state.  
The other critical paper is David Cutler and Jonathan Gruber’s "The Effect of Medicaid 
Expansions on Public Insurance, Private Insurance, and Redistribution."  This paper examines 
the evolution of Medicaid over time. Specifically, it looks at the ways in which the various 
expansions of Medicaid impact how people receive healthcare coverage as well as how the 
various benefits reach people below and around the eligibility thresholds. The paper finds that 
the structure of Medicaid expansions greatly alters the impact of the expansion. States operate 
Medicaid within federal guidelines which give the states wide latitude in determining individual 
eligibility requirements as well as the services covered by the program. The authors note this and 
its impact upon their findings, as the different state eligibility thresholds determine who is 
covered under federally mandated expansions. There is a particularly large regional effect in how 
the expansions affect citizens. States in the Northeast and on the West Coast had more generous 
eligibility requirements than states in the South. Correspondingly, the states in the South saw a 
much larger increase in Medicaid enrollments under the expansions than the other states. The 
authors then look at how Medicaid expansions impacted private insurance coverage. They find 
that the Medicaid expansions resulted in a significant drop in the number of citizens with private 
insurance. This highlights the cross-elasticity of demand for Medicaid and private insurance, 
portraying how people treat the two systems as substitute goods. The authors advocate for future 
expansions or reforms to the program altering the determination of the eligibility structure. They 
state that, under the current system, everyone eligible for Medicaid receives a complete benefit 
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no matter if they are barely eligible for the program or if their income is well below the poverty 
thresholds. As a future alternative, the authors advocate for enrollees in the program receiving a 
larger subsidy if they are poorer and a smaller subsidy if they are wealthier. The paper is relevant 
to the research presented in this paper as it explores the structure of and decision making process 
around Medicaid. This analysis will heavily feature Medicaid, its size and the decisions 
individuals make around enrollment in that program. As such, it is important to examine 
literature on the structure of the program and how that structure effects enrollment. This paper is 
particularly prescient in its observation of the importance of the size of the subsidy enrollees 
receive. A critical part the analysis presented in the following sections will be the actions of 
individuals on the fringe of Medicaid eligibility. This paper notes that individuals barely eligible 
for the subsidies still receive the full value of the benefit and that benefit’s deterrent to those 
individuals seeking private insurance coverage. Essentially, the Medicaid subsidy’s size is fixed 
for all people no matter where on the spectrum of eligibility an individual finds themselves. The 
fixed size of the subsidy prominently features in the theoretical model in the utility calculations. 
The authors also note how this transfer away from private insurance is a wealth transfer to these 
poor families. Both of these facets of Medicaid are important to the analysis in the following 
sections and this paper establishes a robust framework within which this type of analysis can be 
done. The key shortcoming of the extant literature which this study will confront is the paucity of 
rigorous studies of the impact of state governments on Medicaid. There is a further lack of any 
study of partisan complexion’s impact on these issues. 
IV. Thesis, Definitions and Theoretical Model 
Thesis: Divided state governments improve health outcomes of the Medicaid enrollees in states 
through their taxation and healthcare spending policies when compared to unified governments. 
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Divided state government refers to the partisan complexion of each state’s legislature and 
governorship. The partisan complexion refers to which political party controls each part of the 
state government. All the states in this study possess a bicameral (i.e. two body) state legislature 
and a governorship. All of these states have partisan offices in both their legislative and 
executive branch, that is, when a candidate runs for office they must declare their party 
affiliation. After these elections, control of each legislative chamber is determined by whichever 
party can form a majority out of its members. Partisan control of the governorship is determined 
by the governor’s political affiliation. Taken together it can be determined if the state has divided 
or unified government. If one party has majorities in both chambers of the legislature and 
possesses the governor’s mansion, then the state exhibits unified control. If there is any other 
scenario in the state then the state government is classified as divided. From this, the thesis states 
that divided governments are more conducive to improvements in health outcomes of poor 
citizens compared to unified legislatures. The Medicaid program is structured so that in this 
analysis citizens and residents are equivalent, Medicaid enrollees receive benefits in the state 
where they declare their residency. Therefore these terms can be used interchangeably in the 
discussion of both the theoretical model and the results of the estimation of the model. This 
implies that the difference in outcomes between divided and unified governments is larger than 
the difference between unified governments of either party. When there is a divided government, 
the political battle for votes is of increased importance as there is a fierce competition for control 
of government. Therefore, in a divided government situation, the needs of the poor in each state 
are given increased credence by the state. In such states, the competition for votes among the two 
political parties would result in a need to curry favor with poor citizens, creating an incentive for 
governments to improve their healthcare. Furthermore, divided state government necessitates 
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compromise between the parties which theoretically has a positive benefit for poor citizens. 
Taken together, the thesis is that divided state governments improve health outcomes of the 
Medicaid enrollees in states compared to unified governments. 
The complexion of the state governments refers to the partisan makeup of the executive 
branch and legislative branch of state governments. Each state has a similarly constructed 
executive branch with a governor possessing similar powers and all states except Nebraska have 
a bicameral legislature. The lack of a partisan state legislature in Nebraska resulted in the 
dropping of all Nebraska-based data in this analysis.  
The following is a table of political complexion by state over the course of the sample: 
Table 4.1 The Average Political Complexion of Each State from 2000-2014: 
State 
Political 
Complexion 
Mean State 
Political 
Complexion 
Mean 
Alabama 0.400 Montana 0.333 
Alaska 0.467 Nebraska 0.000 
Arizona 0.533 Nevada 0.000 
Arkansas 0.467 New Hampshire 0.533 
California 0.533 New Jersey 0.533 
Colorado 0.667 New Mexico 0.533 
Connecticut 0.267 New York 0.400 
Delaware 0.467 North Carolina 0.866 
Florida 1.000 North Dakota 1.000 
Georgia 0.867 Ohio 0.733 
Hawaii 0.467 Oklahoma 0.400 
Idaho 1.000 Oregon 0.533 
Illinois 0.800 Pennsylvania 0.467 
Indiana 0.267 Rhode Island 0.267 
Iowa 0.333 South Carolina 0.800 
Kansas 0.467 South Dakota 1.000 
Kentucky 0.000 Tennessee 0.400 
Louisiana 0.467 Texas 1.000 
Maine 0.800 Utah 1.000 
Maryland 0.733 Vermont 0.333 
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Massachusetts 0.533 Virginia 0.133 
Michigan 0.467 Washington 0.800 
Minnesota 0.133 West Virginia 0.933 
Mississippi 0.467 Wisconsin 0.467 
Missouri 0.333 Wyoming 0.467 
Note: The above table contains information on the government complexion of each state throughout this time period. 
The variable is a binary dummy variable where every value is a one or a zero. Therefore the mean shown in this 
table is the expected value of the government complexion in each state at any point during the entire sample. 
 This table highlights the vast variety of state government complexions seen since 2000. 
In this dataset, a unified government is shown by having a value of one while a divided 
government has a value of zero. A state is given a value for complexion each year so the mean is 
the average of the state’s complexion for all years of the sample. Since this variable has binary 
outcomes, each state with a non-integer value for their mean highlights how there have been 
changes in government complexion over time since the data reported above is the average seen 
for each state over the entire time period (2000-2014). In fact, very few states have had a divided 
government or a unified government for every year in the sample. Instead states see the 
complexion of their state governments change over the course of the sample. The wide variation 
seen in government complexion is ideal for this analysis as it means that there are many 
observations with both unified and divided governments which increases the strength of the 
empirical model.  
Taxation is another critical aspect addressed in this paper. For the purpose of this 
research, state-level taxation will be defined as the average tax rate that each state imposes on its 
citizens. Each state collects tax revenues in a unique way. Some states rely on a taxation 
structure much like the federal one, in which the principal method for tax collection is an income 
tax on salaried incomes and capital gains. Other states rely on high property taxes and sales taxes 
while imposing a lower income tax upon their citizens. For this paper, the goal will be to look at 
taxation as a whole at the state level and determine the average rate that each citizen faces. This 
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is calculated by taking the total tax revenue that the state collects each year and then dividing it 
by the state’s population. From this per capita tax revenue value, the tax rate is calculated by 
dividing per capita tax revenue by the per capita income in a state.  
From the examination of taxes and the complexion of the state government, this research 
will then examine how the state government approaches healthcare spending on the poor. For the 
period under examination, this will be the amount of money that the state spends on Medicaid. 
The amount of money the state spends on Medicaid will not include any of the money allocated 
to the state from the federal government, but rather just the money that the state has collected in 
taxes and then spends on Medicaid. This is an important distinction because a large portion of 
funding for Medicaid comes from the federal government rather than the state governments. 
Since this research and analysis will focus on the impact of state governments, the federal money 
must be excluded from the analysis. Therefore this research will only consider Medicaid 
spending that comes from the state directly as appropriated by the state legislature as a share of 
income.  
The final component of the analysis is the effect of healthcare coverage and healthcare 
outcomes on individuals. Coverage is defined as the percent of eligible citizens who are actually 
enrolled in Medicaid.  For this analysis, Medicaid is the best program to measure as it is the 
largest program explicitly controlled by the states. As such, it covers the most people in states 
and has the largest amount of state funds allocated to it of all the healthcare programs that the 
state controls. The outcomes will be measured by a health status variable which will help 
demonstrate the efficacy of the various programs the state adopts for its citizens. In particular, 
this variable is particularly attenuated such that those individuals who are enrolled in Medicaid 
are the only individuals whose health is captured. The Current Population Survey tracks both 
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healthcare and enrollment in Medicaid which enables the construction of the healthcare 
outcomes variable. There is a potential source of error introduced into the model at this point as 
the health status variable is not absolute since it is a measure from one to five. To further refine 
this variable, the factor included in this analysis will be the percent of a state’s citizens who 
report a health status of either one or two which is defined as the “bad health” variable. Further 
mitigating the error in this term is the fact that the data is from the Current Population Survey 
which reaches thousands of individuals in each state. Despite the fact that the variable has this 
potential source of error, this still corresponds to the best dataset that could be used for this 
analysis since it measures everything that is needed for the analysis with thousands of 
observations in each state.  
To encapsulate all this in an outline, the following figure roughly displays the theoretical model: 
Figure 4.1 Outlining the Theoretical Model: 
 
 
 
 
 
As the figure shows, the complexion of state governments directly affects taxation policy, 
and together these impact state level healthcare spending on Medicaid. Complexion also impacts 
Medicaid coverage. Healthcare spending then impacts health outcomes with Medicaid coverage 
also playing a significant role in determining the health outcomes for Medicaid enrollees. It is 
important to note here that government complexion does not impact the health outcomes of 
Complexion of 
State Governments 
Tax Revenue 
Medicaid Spending 
Health Outcomes of 
Medicaid Enrollees 
Medicaid Coverage 
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(1) 
Medicaid enrollees directly; rather, the impact of partisan complexion on outcomes is seen 
within the impact that government complexion has on Medicaid coverage and Medicaid 
spending and then those two factors each impact health outcomes for Medicaid enrollees. 
For the empirical framework to reflect this theory, it is important to keep the relationships 
theorized in the overall context of decisions made by both the state and the individual. In taking 
this approach, both the state governments and the individuals are treated as utility maximizers. 
For the individuals, they are governed by an equation that looks like the following Lagrangian 
with the premise that they will each try to maximize their individual utility (individual subscripts 
are omitted for simplicity, the assumption is that this equation governs all individuals, the first 
product is the utility function for the representative individual): 
𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑈(𝑐, 𝑙, ℎ) = 
𝑐𝑡
𝛼 ∗ (𝐿𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡)
(1−𝛼−𝛽) ∗ ℎ𝑡
𝛽 + 𝜇(𝑤𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑡) − 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 ∗ ℎ𝑡 − 𝑃𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑡) 
Where 𝜇 is a Lagrangian multiplier and 𝛼 and 𝛽 are positive with a sum less than one. The 
consumption for the individual is 𝑐𝑡, the healthcare the individual consumes is ℎ𝑡, the wage 
earned is 𝑤𝑡, 𝐿𝑡 is the total hours an individual has available while 𝑙𝑡 is number of hours worked, 
the tax rate is 𝜏𝑡, and the price of healthcare and consumption are indicated by 𝑃𝑐,𝑡  and 𝑃ℎ,𝑡  
respectively. The price of consumption goods, 𝑃𝑐,𝑡, is not observed and is assumed to be one for 
both simplification and illustrative purposes to index the price of healthcare relative to the price 
of consumption goods. Therefore, the individual is subject to the following budget constraint: 
𝑤𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑡) = 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 ∗ ℎ𝑡 + 𝑃𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑡 = 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 ∗ ℎ𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 
This leads to the following first order conditions which focus on the three choices that the 
individual makes: 
(1.1) 
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𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑐𝑡
= 𝛼𝑐𝑡
𝛼−1 ∗ (𝐿𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡)
1−𝛼−𝛽 ∗ ℎ𝑡
𝛽 − 𝜇 = 0 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑙𝑡
= −(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽) ∗ 𝑐𝑡
𝛼 ∗ (𝐿𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡)
−𝛼−𝛽 ∗ ℎ𝑡
𝛽 + 𝜇 ∗ 𝑤𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑡) = 0 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑ℎ𝑡
= 𝛽 ∗ 𝑐𝑡
𝛼 ∗ (𝐿𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡)
1−𝛼−𝛽 ∗ ℎ𝑡
𝛽−1 − 𝜇 ∗ 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 = 0 
With the budget constraint in place, these equations lead to an understanding of the 
structure of the individual’s ability to maximize their utility. This shows the relationship between 
the changes in healthcare prices compared to the change in the prices of other consumption 
goods. With an expansion of Medicaid, the individual is able to move to a higher indifference 
curve due to the increase in the benefit each person receives. In this model it is clear that 
healthcare decreases with an increase in taxes, increases with an increase in the subsidy from the 
state and further increases as income, represented by 𝑤𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑡, increases. When the above 
equations are solved, the following is the equation for ℎ𝑡:  
ℎ𝑡 =
𝛽 ∗ (𝑤𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑡))
𝛼 ∗ 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 ∗ (1 +
𝛽
𝛼)
 
Equation 2.4 shows that the individual’s health choice is influenced directly by after tax 
personal income, the price of healthcare to that individual, and the individual’s unique utility 
function (through unique 𝛼 and 𝛽). The critical aspect of these models for the individual is how 
the state impacts the outcome for the individual through the decisions the state makes. In this 
model, the actions of the state are reflected in the price of healthcare, 𝑃ℎ,𝑡. This model features 
prices for both healthcare and consumption goods. The aspect of individual choices where the 
decisions of the state have an effect is the relative price of healthcare. The state level Medicaid 
program acts as a reimbursement service for enrolled citizens. The reimbursement means that 
(2.1-2.3) 
(2.4) 
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these enrollees pay a price of 0 for those services covered by Medicaid. States have a crucial 
effect on each person’s price of Medicaid because the state both determines the size of the 
subsidy given to citizens as well as which services are covered. Therefore each state has a great 
deal of impact on the healthcare decisions of their poorest citizens each year. It is further 
important to note that this subsidy for provided services is not a cash payment to citizens or a 
voucher program of some cash value. Instead, Medicaid is structured as a reimbursement system 
where the healthcare providers are transferred payments by the government. As such, Medicaid 
outlays can only be sent to the healthcare providers and individuals can only use this subsidy on 
healthcare goods. Below is a model expansion path for a generic individual before and after the 
subsidy. 
   
 In this model case, this individual has a generic demand for two units of healthcare for 
every three units of other consumable goods due to the relative prices of healthcare and 
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Figure 4.2: Model Expansion Path
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consumption goods. The figure highlights how, as its income expands, the individual consumes 
more of each good type in fixed proportions, here those proportions are the same and 
independent of the subsidy. Here, the individual is a utility maximizer. The top line clearly 
shows that the individual immediately is able to and will purchase more healthcare when they 
have Medicaid. The design of the Medicaid program is such that individuals with zero income 
are allowed an allotment of healthcare goods such as doctor’s visits free of charge. Therefore, the 
individual enrolled on Medicaid can consume a nonzero amount of healthcare goods while 
having no income and no consumption goods. The services an enrolled individual receives here 
are set at five units as an example, but that benefit reflects a critical decision of the state. Further, 
the top line has a slope of one which highlights how enrolling in Medicaid alters the relative 
prices for the individual. Previously health was relatively more expensive, but Medicaid 
enrollment lowers the price that the individual observes for healthcare goods and they therefore 
purchase more healthcare goods as a result of enrollment in Medicaid. The theory of this study is 
that the state’s government complexion causes significant differences in the state’s decisions 
which leads to a different benefit size and utilization. The changes to the benefit then impact the 
individual’s health as increased or decreased access to health services result in an increase or 
decrease in the health of that person. The decision of the state with respect to the benefits of 
Medicaid is one of the key aspects of state level decisions examined below. 
It should be noted that the above figure only displays the income expansion path for an 
individual who is always eligible for Medicaid. If at any point the individual is no longer eligible 
for Medicaid, their purchases immediately drop down to the lower line as they no longer receive 
the subsidy. This creates a perverse incentive for the utility maximizing individual to not seek to 
always maxmize their income. If the individual hovers around Medicaid eligibility when 
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maximizing their income, it is in the individual’s interest to refrain from maximizing their 
income as losing the subsidy results in a decrease in the healthcare goods that they can purchase 
and by the utility function, a decrease in their overall utility. Furthermore, this figure does not 
visually demostrate the impact that quotas may have on individuals. As referenced in the case 
study, some states cap the benefits that an individual may receive under Medicaid. If an 
individual was in one of those states where the program’s benefits are limited, then their price of 
healthcare ceases to be augmented at the point where they have consumed the entirety of the 
Medicaid benefit. Visually, this would alter the slope of the top line in figure 4.2 to having the 
same slope as the line for the individual not enrolled in the Medicaid program. 
The state faces a welfare calculation similar to a utility framework where the state’s goal 
is to maximize welfare. The state faces the following Lagrangian which consists of the state’s 
welfare function and a Lagrangian multiplier multiplied by the state’s budget constraint:  
𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑊𝑠,𝑡  = 
(𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑠,𝑡))
𝛽1
∗ 𝐸𝑠,𝑡
1−𝛽1−𝛽2 ∗ 𝐻𝑠,𝑡
𝛽2 +  𝜑 ∗ (𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝜏𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑠,𝑡) 
Where s and t are the subscripts for the state and time while 𝑤𝑠,𝑡 is the wage across the state for 
total labor hours 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 (the sum of all 𝑙𝑠,𝑡), 𝜏𝑠,𝑡 is the tax rate, 𝑆𝑠,𝑡 is the total Medicaid subsidy in 
the state which is equivalent to Medicaid spending, 𝐸𝑠,𝑡 is the employment seen by a state’s 
citizens, 𝐻𝑠,𝑡 is the healthcare coverage in the state, 𝜑 is a Lagrangian multiplier, and 𝑅𝑠,𝑡 
represents the rest of the state’s spending that is not related to Medicaid. The exponents 𝛽1 and 
𝛽2 are both constrained to values between zero and one with a sum of less than one. For the 
purposes of this paper, healthcare coverage 𝐻𝑠,𝑡 can be further refined to be a function of 𝑆𝑠,𝑡, the 
state’s total spending on Medicaid. The literature on Medicaid expansions indicates that 
(3.1) 
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𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝜏𝑠,𝑡 
(3.1.1) 
Figure 4.3.1: Example of Healthcare Coverage in a Given State 
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𝑠,
𝑡
∗
𝑆 𝑠
,𝑡
𝜗
 
𝐻𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑠,𝑡 ∗ (𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝜏𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑠,𝑡)
𝜗 
Medicaid coverage is a function of spending with decreasing marginal returns, therefore it will 
be modeled thusly: 
𝐻𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑠,𝑡
𝜗
 with 
𝑑𝐻
𝑑𝑆
> 0 and 
𝑑2𝐻
𝑑𝑆2
≤ 0 
Where 𝜗 is greater than 0 but less than or equal to 1 and 𝑚𝑠,𝑡 is a constant.  Equation 
3.1.1 can be illustrated in the following figure: 
 
  
 
This figure shows how the state’s budget constraint interacts with the other terms in the 
model. It is apparent here that healthcare coverage is a function of the total state spending on 
Medicaid, but the budget constraint further illuminates the fact that Medicaid spending is a 
function of tax revenue, 𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝜏𝑠,𝑡, and the amount the state spends on all other programs. 
When the state maximizes its welfare, the state chooses an ideal value for 𝑆𝑠,𝑡 which in turn 
builds the function for healthcare coverage. The value of healthcare coverage for the state at the 
26 
 
state’s welfare maximizing point is seen where the 𝐻𝑠,𝑡 curve is tangent to the budget line. This 
assumes that the state is a welfare maximizer while attempting to minimize their expenditure 
level which is equivalent to the state minimizing the tax rate. The tangency of the two curves 
therefore reflects the optimal, welfare maximizing, value of 𝐻𝑠,𝑡. Furthermore, the subsidy can 
be recalibrated as a function of taxes. Each state devotes a certain amount of their tax revenue to 
their Medicaid program, the above theoretical model can be redefined in terms of this “Medicaid 
subsidy” which is equal to the percent of each dollar of personal income in the state that the state 
collect as tax to specifically pay for Medicaid. This is related by the following equations where 
𝑠𝑠,𝑡 is the Medicaid subsidy. 
𝑆𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑠,𝑡  and so  (𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝜏𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑠,𝑡) = (𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ (𝜏𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠,𝑡) − 𝑅𝑠,𝑡) 
This means that the state’s welfare Lagrangian can be related as: 
𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑊𝑠,𝑡 = (𝑤 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑠,𝑡))
𝛽1
∗ 𝐸𝑠,𝑡
1−𝛽1−𝛽2 ∗ (𝑚𝑠,𝑡 ∗ (𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑠,𝑡)  
𝜗)𝛽2 
+ 𝜑 ∗ (𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ (𝜏𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠,𝑡) − 𝑅𝑠,𝑡) 
The aspects of this equation over which the state government can exercise control are the 
critical parts of this analysis presented in Section VII. The state government has control over 𝑠𝑠,𝑡 
and 𝜏𝑠,𝑡 while being constrained by the revenue the state brings in 𝑊𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝜏𝑠,𝑡 less the 
amount the state spends which for simplicity are viewed as spending on either Medicaid or on all 
other programs. When the state government maximizes its utility with respect to what it may 
control, the following are the first order conditions: 
  
(3.1.2) 
(3.2) 
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𝑑𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑎𝑛
𝑑𝜏𝑠,𝑡
= −𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝛽1 ∗ (𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑠,𝑡))
𝛽1−1
∗ 𝐸𝑠,𝑡
1−𝛽1−𝛽2
∗ (𝑚𝑠,𝑡 ∗ (𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑠,𝑡)  
𝜗)
𝛽2
+  𝜑 ∗ 𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 = 0 
𝑑𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑎𝑛
𝑑𝑠𝑠,𝑡
= 𝜗 ∗ 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑚𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑠,𝑡
1−𝛽1−𝛽2 ∗ (𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑠,𝑡)
𝜗−1 
∗ (𝑚𝑠,𝑡 ∗ (𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑠,𝑡)
𝜗)
𝛽2−1
∗ (𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑠,𝑡))
𝛽1
−  𝜑 ∗ 𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 = 0 
The states also face the following budget constraint: 
𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝜏𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑠,𝑡 
When solved for the equilibrium value of the Medicaid subsidy, the above equations 
yield the following equation:  
𝑠𝑠,𝑡 =
𝜗 ∗ 𝛽2 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑠,𝑡)
𝛽1
 
The state derives its welfare from three key factors: income, employment and healthcare 
coverage. The definition of the equation for healthcare coverage indicates that as 𝑠𝑠,𝑡 and income 
increase, so does 𝐻𝑠,𝑡. The state also sees an increase in healthcare spending when the Medicaid 
subsidy increases as well as when incomes increase. When looked at in relative isolation as seen 
in equation 4.2 in the appendix, the Medicaid subsidy decreases as the tax rate increases, the tax 
rate is not the sole driver of the Medicaid subsidy as the values of 𝜗, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 each impact the 
Medicaid subsidy.  
A key factor in both the theoretical and empirical model of this paper is the complexion 
of state governments. It is important to note that complexion does not directly appear in the 
state’s utility calculation. However, government complexion is important to the relationships 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
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Welfare for a given State with a Unified Government 
Welfare for that same State under 
the same Conditions with a 
Divided Government 
above. Different state government complexions alter the composition of the Medicaid program in 
each state. Namely, the government complexion of the state alters the utility function by altering 
the corresponding 𝜗, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 values within the utility function. The thesis presented earlier 
posits that a movement towards unified government, numerically defined as a positive increase 
in government complexion, results in a negative change in health outcomes which is represented 
as ℎ𝑡. This implies that a shift towards unified government complexion increases the tax rate, 
decreases healthcare spending and decreases healthcare coverage. These connections allow for 
the relationships including government complexion to be modeled since the above expression 
highlights the theorized relationship between government complexion and the rest of the model.  
The following figure depicts how this relationship posited by the thesis comes to fruition 
in the welfare functions of the states: 
 
Figure 4.3.2: Welfare Differences Caused by Government Complexion 
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As reflected in the thesis, when a state has a unified government, that state’s welfare 
function places a much larger point of emphasis on maximizing the citizen’s post tax income (the 
values on the y-axis). Divided governments pay much more heed to healthcare coverage (the 
values of the x-axis). In turn, healthcare coverage has a positive direct relationship with the 
health outcomes, completing the thesis. As in the previous figure, the state faces a budget 
constraint. This constraint has multiple key features, one of these is the fact that each state’s set 
of indifference curves run tangential to the budget curve when the state maximizes its welfare. 
Another key feature is the fact that the Medicaid subsidy 𝑠𝑠,𝑡 and the general tax rate 𝜏𝑠,𝑡 have an 
impact on each other. In the outline of the theoretical model this was expected. The outline 
highlights that general tax rate increases impact Medicaid spending, specifically that divided 
state governments increase taxes which increases Medicaid spending (which is seen in an 
increase in Medicaid subsidies). This relationship is accounted for in the calculation of the 
Medicaid subsidy seen in equation 3.6, but the relationship between the overall tax rate and 
Medicaid subsidies is also in the budget constraint of equation 3.5. The fact that these variables 
appear twice in the equations above adds complexity to the estimation of these relationships. 
This is more fully explored in the discussion on the empirical model and the results of the 
estimation. 
Additionally, in this time period of 2000-2014, the states face a major decision on 
Medicaid; namely, whether or not to expand the program as part of the Affordable Care Act 
which passed in 2010. The law allowed for the states to drastically expand Medicaid eligibility 
for their citizens and while the federal government would pay for some of the costs of the 
expansion, the states were still liable for some costs depending on how they structured their 
expansion. For instance, if the states expanded Medicaid before 2014, they would bear up to 10% 
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of the costs of the new enrollees while changes made in 2014 would be paid for by the federal 
government. The states also receive no reimbursement from the federal government for the 
additional administrative costs of enrolling more individuals nor for the costs associated with 
enticing the newly eligible to sign up for the program. As such, the states faced a key choice to 
make for the years at the end of the sample that is independent of their complexion for the rest of 
the period. This choice will be modeled in later iterations of the model to highlight the impact 
that the decisions states make have on their Medicaid programs. Below is a model indifference 
curve for a state who faces the choice to expand Medicaid: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This figure highlights the welfare balance a state attempts to maintain while employment 
is held constant. This figure is not one that all states would see or experience. In this sample 
case, the expansion designed by the Affordable Care Act, the states are presented with an 
opportunity to move to a higher indifference curve due to an influx of federal dollars to fund 
Medicaid expansions. However, this change is not entirely one way as the states still have an 
added cost to expanding the program which would need to be paid for by increasing Medicaid 
subsidies slightly. The states therefore face another choice, whether to expand Medicaid at a 
Welfare with expansion 
Welfare 
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Figure 4.3.3: Model set of State’s Indifference Curves with Medicaid Expansion 
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greatly reduced cost or to stand pat throughout this time period and incur no additional program 
costs. In the figure above, the state would be able to move to a higher indifference curve but their 
move is not at a direct horizontal shift. The state will still have a tradeoff with the Medicaid 
expansion which will require an increase in taxes. This decision is why, under this framework, 
not all states choose to expand Medicaid. Some states will have a welfare function that favors 
low taxes much more than healthcare coverage. In other words, those states have 𝛽1values which 
are substantially larger than their 𝛽2 values. Therefore, it is possible for some states to face a net 
decrease in their welfare when given an opportunity to expand Medicaid. The theory of this 
study is that the states with welfare curves of this shape are the states with a unified government. 
Whether or not this decision is influenced in any way by partisan complexion in reality is 
unclear, but this relationship is an interesting facet of this data which will be explored in 
forthcoming sections. 
Figure 4.3.3 has further implications for the empirical model of the theoretical 
relationships. The state’s welfare indifference curves underscore the fact that the state is acting 
as an economic agent making decisions within an established framework. The state faces a key 
tradeoff between maximizing their citizen’s incomes and maximizing their healthcare coverage. 
Most importantly, the state’s preferences which are motivated by government complexion 
determine the shape of and position on the state’s welfare indifference curve. Taken all together, 
the theoretical model clearly establishes the data necessary for the estimation of these 
relationships. 
V. Data Sources and Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
For this analysis, the majority of the data comes from the Census Bureau’s Current 
Population Survey. This survey interviews thousands of Americans each month and monitors 
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their welfare status, income, healthcare coverage and health condition. The particular data used 
for this analysis will consist of Current Population Survey data from 1999-2014. The focus will 
be from 2000-2014, but some 1999 data is needed to determine the impact of lagged effects. This 
data is curated by the University of Minnesota Population Center’s Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS) center. The year 2000 reflects the best starting point for the data as 
Medicaid was significantly altered in the 1990s by the Clinton administration. As part of a larger 
welfare reform package, a large part of Medicaid’s funding and discretionary allocations was 
transferred to the states from the federal government. By the year 2000, these changes had fully 
taken place which precludes any of the administrative aspects of the transfer of the program to 
the states from introducing error into a model. The final year of the dataset being 2014 
corresponds to the last year of complete data available from both the Current Population Survey 
and other ancillary data sources. These ancillary data sources correspond to the sources for the 
complexion of state government data, the information on state taxation and the information on 
state Medicaid expenditures. The complexion of state government data is widely available from a 
variety of sources that curate the information from the states themselves. The specific dataset 
used in this analysis of state government complexion is from the National Conference of State 
Legislatures which covers the entire time period in question. Despite the fact that that 
organization is focused on state legislatures, the dataset also includes information on the 
governorship in each state. The Census Bureau also collects data on how states collect taxes and 
will be the source of the state tax data for this analysis. State level Medicaid spending for the 
years 2000 through 2014 is available from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
which is a division of the Department of Health and Human Services. Where this data has gaps, 
the spending data will come from the National Association of State Budget Officers which tracks 
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the state spending on Medicaid closely. Supplemental data on participation rates not found in the 
data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services will come from the Kaiser Family 
Foundation’s Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. 
Each of the variables used in the estimation is shown in the table below. These variables 
either directly relate to the theoretical model or are components of the vector which controls for 
the characteristics of each state to increase the accuracy of the estimation. Below is a summary 
of the key variables: 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
 Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tax rate  784 0.0886 0.0788 0.0046 0.1209 
          Government Complexion 735 0.5497 0.4979 0.0000 1.0000 
   ln(personal income)  735 10.5020 0.2059 9.9774 11.1090 
Unemployment Rate  735 5.9469 2.0310 2.3000 13.7833 
     Gini  784 0.4746 0.0222 0.4098 0.5785 
% of the adult population between the ages of 18-30  784 0.2653 0.0250 0.2019 0.3723 
         % of the adult population above age 50  784 0.2667 0.0350 0.1686 0.3787 
Male % of the population  784 0.4821 0.0119 0.4488 0.5144 
   White % of the population 784 0.8115 0.1317 0.1949 0.9877 
      Population in Millions  735 6.0913 6.6567 0.4943 38.6808 
    Medicaid Subsidy  735 0.0152 0.0166 0.0007 0.0794 
   % in poverty  735 0.1278 0.0335 0.0530 0.2311 
Healthcare Coverage  784 0.7331 0.0688 0.3887 0.9450 
   Bad Health  735 0.3429 0.0883 0.1224 0.6415 
Note: The above table contains simple summary statistics for all of the variables to be used in the regressions in the following sections. 
It is crucial to note that some values have more observations than others for the purposes of 
constructing lagged variables. Some of the data goes back to 1999 to aid in the construction of 
lagged variables while the rest of the data is in the 2000-2014 timeframe that the models will 
address. The bad health index describes the portion of state’s Medicaid enrolled residents who 
report bad health. This will be the key factor in determining outcomes. Multiple variables in this 
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table and analysis deal with the background economic and demographic conditions in each state. 
These will measure the economic well-being of individuals in states to control for the conditions 
that could alter the results of the estimations. These will appear in the equations in the results 
section as part of a “control vector”. One of these factors is a Gini coefficient for each state 
which will highlight how inequality impacts each relationship that is estimated. A key aspect of 
this metric is that Gini is not calculated for each state from people’s personal income as is the 
traditional format. Rather, the Gini coefficient calculated in this data is from the sum of personal 
income and total Medicaid transfers to individuals in the state to form a further nuanced picture 
of inequality in each state for each time period. It is important to note that the Medicaid transfers 
included in the calculation of this Gini coefficient include transfers from both the state and the 
federal government. However, this variable is not an independent variable included in the 
theoretical model, but rather a factor introduced to control for the background conditions in a 
state. Hence, the confluence of federal and state dollars does not obfuscate the estimation results 
when the Gini coefficient is included. The unemployment rate is the U-3 unemployment rate in 
each state at a given time t. The U-3 unemployment rate is the sum of the number of people 
unemployed as a percentage of all members of the civilian labor force who are either employed 
or actively looking for work. The percent below the poverty line is the percent of the state’s 
residents who are below the federal poverty line. The table also includes the summary values for 
the government complexion variable seen previously, this table merely condenses that value into 
a presentable format for all states in the time period. The table includes the tax rate, personal 
income, and healthcare variables that will prove crucial to this analysis. It is important to note 
that tax rate as defined in this table and for the duration of the empirical analysis is the tax rate 
derived from the total tax liability that a citizen faces from the state. This variable is equal to the 
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tax revenue that the state extracts from each individual divided by average personal income in 
the state. The Medicaid subsidy is calculated in a similar fashion, as the total Medicaid spending 
per person in the state divided by average personal income. The Medicaid subsidy will be how 
this analysis will approach healthcare spending from the state on the Medicaid enrolled 
population. When this is calibrated, federal Medicaid dollars are excluded from the analysis. For 
most of the timeframe this data examines, the share of all Medicaid funding from the federal 
government is consistent. In the last years of the sample, the share of all Medicaid dollars from 
the federal government decreases because, when states expanded Medicaid as part of the 
Affordable Care Act, the federal government bore a larger share of the cost than normal. To 
confront potential error source, estimations of the empirical models possess variables which 
control for the Medicaid expansion. These variables which control for the Medicaid expansion 
will be further explored in the results section when they are introduced. The Medicaid subsidy 
variable creates a subsidy size in every year which is proportional to the size of the Medicaid 
program in a state in a given year. 
VI. Empirical Model 
The empirical model will capture the relationship between each phase of the theoretical 
model. The first two equations highlighted below display the relationship between the 
complexion of the state government and taxation and then the effect of each of those on revenue 
collection specifically for healthcare spending. Each of these equations will feature unique 
coefficients and unique error terms. Using the same variables as defined earlier in the discussion 
of the theoretical model:  
𝜏𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2% 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀1,𝑠,𝑡 
𝑠𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝜏𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾3% 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀2,𝑠,𝑡 
(6.1) 
(6.2) 
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Each of these equations needs to account for external factors not inherently related to the 
theoretical model but captured in the welfare maximization for the state. Therefore each equation 
includes the percent of the population below the poverty line. This variable will proxy for how 
wealthy a state is. It is important that this variable is used here rather than personal income for 
mechanical reasons. The calculation of the tax rates in both equations is as a share of personal 
income in a state. If personal income were used as an independent variable in the estimation of 
variables constructed with personal income as factor then the estimation would yield biased 
coefficients. The first dependent variable is the tax rate. The overall tax variable, 𝜏𝑠,𝑡, refers to 
the tax rate on each marginal dollar earned in the state calculated in the first equation. It is 
designed to capture the size of the tax burden that each state puts on its citizens. This factor is 
related to personal income as richer states can levy a lower tax rate and still reap substantial 
revenues. The final variable in equation 6.1, 𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡, is the government complexion at time t in 
each state. In the second equation, the independent variable is the Medicaid subsidy, a reflection 
of how much that only the state spends on Medicaid. If this relationship is estimated in a simple 
OLS-style framework, then the second equation in this form has a large amount of bias. This bias 
originates from the fact that the overall tax rate and the Medicaid subsidy are tied together by the 
state’s budget constraint. In future estimations outside of an OLS-type framework, this direct 
relationship will be explored but in the initial estimation of the second equation, the general tax 
rate variable will be omitted. From there, the next two equations will look at the effect of the 
Medicaid subsidy on coverage and then the combination of those two upon healthcare outcomes. 
𝐻𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜌1 + 𝜌2𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜌3𝐻𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜌4ℎ𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜀3,𝑠,𝑡 
ℎ𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜔1 + 𝜔2𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔3ℎ𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜔4𝐻𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔5𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀4,𝑠,𝑡 
(6.3) 
(6.4) 
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Health coverage (variable 𝐻𝑠,𝑡) is the percent of all enrolled citizens in Medicaid compared to 
the number of people eligible in that state at that time. This essentially becomes the Medicaid 
participation rate. The third equation features a lag of that same variable, the same government 
complexion factor seen in the other equations and a lagged physical health factor. The final 
equation determines health outcomes of those enrolled in Medicaid. This projects health 
(variable ℎ𝑠,𝑡) as a function of the Medicaid subsidy, lagged health and health coverage and 
income in the current time. The lagged variables are included here in equations 6.3 and 6.4 
because these factors are clearly influenced by the value they had in the prior period. For 
equation 6.3, healthcare coverage in the current year is impacted by the share of eligible people 
who had coverage last year, these citizens would roll over their program benefits from one year 
to the next. Healthcare coverage is also impacted by how sick the state was in the previous 
period since, if the state is sicker, those eligible for powerful healthcare subsidies are more likely 
to enroll in Medicaid and drive up future enrollments. In equation 6.4 the variable for health 
outcomes has a one year-lag because health in the current time period is highly correlated with 
health in the previous time period. This study makes several assumptions about the lagged 
variables. If someone is currently sick, there is an increased likelihood that they were sick in the 
past and will be in the future, therefore the one year lag must be included. These lagged variables 
are only a one year lag as opposed to a multiyear lag since the changes to healthcare coverage are 
believed to appear quickly in the data. Further, for the lagged variables in each equation, the 
variable’s value in the previous year contains all of the information contained in all the other 
prior periods’ data as well. Therefore the previous year is the only necessary lag.  
All four of these equations will utilize the same econometric technique of Ordinary Least 
Squares regression when estimated in the first iteration. It is important to note that, for the 
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optimal model, the equations for taxation revenue, healthcare spending and health should be 
simultaneously solved as a system of equations rather than solved for independently. When 
estimated simultaneously, these equations will be estimated in a two stage least squares process. 
This process is selected rather than three stage least squares as two stage least squares is more 
robust in this situation due to the fact that it is less sensitive to the precision of the model’s 
calibration. 11 Another important factor to account for when solving these equations is to ensure 
that they are grouped into their proper state and time subscripted groups. This will be done by 
controlling for the fixed state and year effects when conducting the estimations. 
Beyond simple econometric controls for fixed state and year effects, the background 
conditions of each state deserve consideration in the estimation of these models. Therefore there 
are two key vectors added to the models in some iterations of the estimation of these equations. 
The model needs to control for the background demographic conditions in each state. To make 
this possible the estimations will feature a controls vector containing information about the state 
in that given time. The second key vector added for some estimations is whether or not the state 
chose to expand Medicaid as part of the Affordable Care Act. 
VII. Results, Modelling and Discussion 
Due to the nature of the empirical models, four iterations of the estimations of the models are 
produced. The first iteration of the model is a simple iteration where each of the equations is 
estimated separately with none of the control factors present and no time lags in the model 
outside of what was detailed in the empirical model. The estimation technique for the first 
iteration is a cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with generalized least squares 
                                                     
11 Wooldridge, J. (2013) 
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coefficients and heteroskedastic panels. Further, the estimation controls for both state and year 
fixed effects. The first iteration of the first equation is as presented in the empirical model 
section and is as follows:  
𝜏𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2% 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀1,𝑠,𝑡 
 The results of this equation are in table 7.1.1 in the appendix. The results of the first 
regression support the theoretical model. Government complexion has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the tax rate. The coefficient on government complexion is 0.0065 which 
means that unified governments increase the tax rate by 0.65 percentage point in the aggregate. 
This coefficient has a statistically significant z score of 3.94 which affirms the impact of state 
government complexion on tax rates in this estimation of the model. The theoretical model in 
section four posited that this would be the relationship observed and that it would have this sign. 
This equation also displays the expected relationship between percent in poverty and taxation. 
The percent of a state’s citizens in poverty has a statistically significant coefficient of 0.2171 
with a z score of 4.93. The implication of this, that for each one percentage point increase in the 
share of a state’s population in poverty there is a 0.22 percentage point increase in the tax rate, is 
also aligned with the theoretical model. The theoretical model stated that if a state were 
wealthier, here shown as an increase in personal income, then the state would experience a lower 
tax rate. This is because a rich state can sustain the same programs as a poor one with a lower tax 
rate due to the larger income present in the state.  
 The first iteration of the second equation is as follows: 
𝑠𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2% 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀2,𝑠,𝑡 (7.1.2) 
(7.1.1) 
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The results of this equation are in table 7.1.2 in the appendix. This equation produces 
statistically significant results for both government complexion and the percent of a state’s 
residents in poverty. This result is a refutation of a key part of the theoretical model. The 
theoretical model posited that there was an inverse relationship between government complexion 
and the Medicaid subsidy. This estimation suggests the opposite is true. The government 
complexion variable has a statistically significant positive coefficient of 0.0011 with a z score of 
2.34. This effect implies that a shift in the state’s government complexion to unified from 
divided results in a 0.11 percentage point increase in the Medicaid subsidy. This is a breakdown 
of the theoretical model in that the theoretical model posited the opposite relationship between 
the two. This result instead states that unified governments have a positive effect on the 
Medicaid subsidy. It was expected that the coefficient on government complexion would be 
negative and that it would be large as it was posited that the effect on spending was substantial. 
The poverty rate in the state also has a statistically significant relationship with a z score of 3.19 
and a coefficient of 0.0416. This result states that as the poverty rate increases by one percentage 
point, the state’s Medicaid subsidy increases by 0.0416 percentage points. This result is expected 
to be significant because an impoverished population should increase a state’s healthcare 
spending. Since Medicaid is a program for low income Americans, as the poverty in a state 
increases, the spending on Medicaid should increase. The materialization of that finding here 
lends credence to the theoretical model as it comports with the intuition of the study. 
 The largest sources of variation in Medicaid subsidy are the state effects and the year 
effects. These are contained in table 7.1.2.1. In all of the analysis of state effects contained in this 
section, the state effects view Alabama as the base case due to the fact that it is first in the 
regression. The state effects are quite significant in some cases and quite large in others. These 
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results imply that on aggregate Kentucky has the highest Medicaid subsidy after controlling for 
government complexion and the percent of residents in poverty while Tennessee has the 
smallest. The state of Kentucky provided a Medicaid subsidy 2.07 percentage points above the 
base case on all income in the state for allocations on Medicaid, the largest such extra levy in the 
nation. By contrast, Tennessee has a subsidy 2.08 percentage points lower than the base case on 
aggregate for their Medicaid funding. North Carolina has a 0.23 percentage point subsidy 
reduction compared to the base case. The z score of the North Carolina state effect is -0.31 which 
implies that it is not possible to affirm the existence of this relative reduction at a reasonable 
level of statistical confidence. California, another state considered in the overview of state 
Medicaid programs, has a 1.34 percentage point subsidy cut relative to the base case. 
California’s state effect has a z score of -1.91 which is not significant at the 95% confidence 
level but it is significant at the 90% confidence level. 
To illustrate the growth of the Medicaid program over time, the year effects are graphed below: 
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Figure 7.1.2: Year Effects on the Medicaid Subsidy
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The year effect is statistically significant in nine of the years in the record. Most notably, 
the year effect is larger at the start and the close of the sample. The Medicaid subsidy decreases 
to a relatively stable rate below the base case of the year 2000 from 2004 to 2011. The recession 
clearly negatively impacts Medicaid subsidies for a four year period as there are statistically 
significant negative year effects for 2008-2011. However, spending on Medicaid resumes 
increasing from 2011 to 2012 and continues to increase until 2014. The coefficients on the year 
effects are large, especially when compared with the coefficients on the variables. This rapid 
increase, and largest year effect, coincides with the passage of the Affordable Care Act. Further, 
as part of that law, the Medicaid expansion in many states fully opened in 2014 which appears to 
have impacted the Medicaid subsidy as this year has the largest increase of any year, resulting in 
a 0.96 percentage point increase in the Medicaid subsidy in the aggregate. This suggests that the 
state’s decision to expand Medicaid is crucially important to the Medicaid subsidy. This supports 
the theoretical model by showcasing the importance of the policy decisions that states make with 
respect to healthcare policy. It is important that the Medicaid subsidy still only addresses the 
state’s allocations to Medicaid. The size of the state’s Medicaid subsidy is significantly impacted 
by the decision to expand Medicaid even though much of the funds for the expansion comes 
from the federal government. This result also underscores a key precept of the theoretical model, 
that the decisions that states make matter and have an impact on their citizens. 
The initial iteration of equation three is as follows: 
𝐻𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜌1 + 𝜌2𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜌3𝐻𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜌4ℎ𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜀3,𝑠,𝑡 
 The results of this estimation are seen in table 7.1.3. The theoretical model is supported 
by the results of this estimation. The theoretical model hypothesized that unified government 
would decrease Medicaid coverage in a state. That result is borne out by this estimation as the 
(7.1.3) 
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government complexion variable has a statistically significant negative coefficient which 
confirmed the theoretical model’s assertion. The coefficient on government complexion is -
0.0053 which shows that unified governments result in a 0.53 percentage point decrease in 
Medicaid enrollment for the eligible population in that state. A larger effect is seen in the health 
coverage in the previous period. Its coefficient is much larger at 0.449 which highlights how the 
health coverage in a given state for a given year is significantly impacted by the health coverage 
in the previous period in that state. A highly interesting aspect of this estimation is that the 
previous period’s poor health in a state fails to have a statistically significant impact on the 
percent of those eligible for Medicaid. As such, it does not appear that the bad health of a state’s 
poor population has any impact on Medicaid enrollment. This suggests that the health of those 
enrolled in Medicaid does not have an impact on whether or not those individuals remain 
enrolled in Medicaid. The expectation for this variable was that if a large fraction of a state’s 
Medicaid enrollees have poor health, then they would remain on Medicaid rolls which would 
result in a large positive relationship between the bad health variable and the healthcare coverage 
variable. This fails to materialize here and, as a result, this iteration of the model appears to 
suggest that there is not a relationship between the health of a state’s Medicaid enrollees and a 
state’s enrollment percentage. 
 The first iteration of the fourth equation is as follows: 
ℎ𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜔1 + 𝜔2𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔3ℎ𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜔4𝐻𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔5𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀4,𝑠,𝑡 
 The results from the estimation of this equation can be seen in table 7.1.4. This equation 
features a partial breakdown of the theoretical model. The theoretical model stated that 
healthcare coverage and healthcare spending were each key drivers of health outcomes. The 
individual’s utility framework also suggested that as personal income increased, their health 
(7.1.4) 
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status would also increase. This estimation finds that the positive coefficients on healthcare 
coverage and personal income fail to be statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The 
two variables in the equation to have a statistically significant impact on poor health of Medicaid 
enrollees are the health of the Medicaid enrollees in that state in the prior period and the 
Medicaid subsidy. The Medicaid subsidy has a coefficient of -0.2670 with a z score of -2.18. 
This result implies that as the state increases their Medicaid subsidy by one percentage point the 
share of Medicaid enrollees with poor health decreases by 0.267 percentage points. This 
corroborates the theoretical model as an increase in the Medicaid subsidy is expected to decrease 
the share of Medicaid enrollees with poor health. The state and year effects of this model display 
few patterns as seen in table 7.1.4.1. After controlling for the above independent variables and 
year effects, the state with the worst health outcomes for its Medicaid enrollees is West Virginia 
while the state with the best health outcomes for its Medicaid enrollees is Minnesota. North 
Carolina’s Medicaid enrollees have better health than the base case with a 9.70 percentage point 
decrease in the percent of Medicaid enrollees reporting bad health on aggregate. While this 
figure might seem large, it is not when compared to the other state effects. In fact, this is the 
eighth smallest effect. The year effects indicate that the health of those enrolled in Medicaid 
improved over the course of the sample although the recession caused this improvement to abate 
slightly in 2008 and 2009.  
The second iteration of the model is similar to the first iteration. However the second 
iteration features the key addition of the controls vector and the variables for Medicaid 
expansion. The control vector features key demographic and economic conditions of each state 
that help adjust the model by attempting to eliminate omitted variable bias. This vector contains 
a Gini coefficient, unemployment rate,  the percent of citizens who are between the ages of 18 
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and 30, the percent of citizens who are older than 50, the percent of the population of the state 
who are male, the percent of the state’s population who are white, and the population of the state 
in millions. There is a second vector added to this iteration corresponding to the state’s decision 
to expand Medicaid. This vector contains a dummy variable which is only equal to one when the 
state has expanded Medicaid in that year and is equal to zero in all other periods. The vector also 
contains an interaction term for government complexion and Medicaid expansion to determine 
how these two aspects of state influence each other. There is a final significant addition to this 
iteration compared to the earlier iterations. Another demographic variable is added, the average 
number of school-age children in a household. This is because states spend much of their tax 
revenue on public education. This will serve to proxy the amount the state spends on other 
programs besides Medicaid which will add a variable to the determination of the tax equation not 
seen in the Medicaid subsidy equation and improves the robustness of the estimation. The 
estimation technique for this iteration is the same as for the first iteration. The second iteration of 
the first equation is as presented in the empirical model section and is as follows: 
𝜏𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2% 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀1,𝑠,𝑡 
The results of the estimation of this model are shown in table 7.2.1 in the appendix. The 
results of this estimation highlight several interesting aspects of the empirical model and 
theoretical model. This estimation possesses results which comport with the initial result in the 
first iteration. A critical result of this estimation is that the government complexion variable, GC, 
produces statistically significant results. The theoretical model asserted that government 
complexion was a key driver of the tax revenue that states collect. The theoretical model also 
stated that the relationship between tax rates and government complexion was positive, that a 
(7.2.1) 
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shift towards a unified government increased the tax rate. That relationship appears as 
government complexion has a coefficient of 0.0055 z score of 2.67. It is therefore possible to 
conclude that unified governments increase the tax rate in those states by 0.55 percentage points. 
The percent of a state’s residents in poverty, which previously had a statistically significant 
coefficient, continues to possess statistical power once the model is recalibrated. The percent of a 
state’s residents in poverty has a coefficient of 0.1517 and a z score of 2.45. This result means 
that as the percent of a state’s residents in poverty increases by one percentage point, the tax rate 
increases by 15.17 percentage points. This coefficient is quite large and shows that the 
magnitude of an increase in poverty is much larger than a change in government complexion. 
None of the variables in the controls vector are statistically significant save for the Gini 
coefficient. That variable has a statistically significant positive coefficient with a z score of 1.97. 
This result shows that as income inequality in a state increases, the tax rate also increases. 
The second iteration of the second equation is as follows:  
𝑠𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2% 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀2,𝑠,𝑡 
The outputs for this model are shown in table 7.2.2. This estimation of equation 2 provides 
another statistically significant result for government complexion. The Medicaid subsidy in a 
state in the current year is significantly and positively impacted by the presence of a unified 
government as it has a z score of 2.87 and a coefficient of 0.0014. The coefficient means that 
there is a 0.14 percentage point increase in the Medicaid subsidy when there is a unified 
government compared to a divided government. This strengthens the notion that unified 
governments actually increase the amount spent on Medicaid in their state. This result is similar 
to the result in the initial estimation of this equation in that it significantly displays an opposite 
relationship compared to what is expected in the theoretical model.  
(7.2.2) 
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No other variables in this estimation have statistically significant coefficients. However, 
it should be noted that, just because the model only has one variable with a statistically 
significant positive coefficient, that does not mean that the model itself is not robust. The entire 
model has a Wald Chi-squared statistic of 1145.62. This value is quite significant as the 
probability of it occurring randomly is less than 0.001 well beyond the necessary level for 
statistical significance. This statistic shows that the model itself is quite powerful even if the 
coefficients on the variables are not. The state and year effects, found in table 7.2.2.1 present 
almost the exact same picture as in the first estimation of this equation. The state effects are quite 
significant in some cases and quite large in others. These results now imply that on aggregate 
New Jersey has the highest Medicaid subsidy after accounting for all these factors while 
California has the smallest. The state of New Jersey provides a Medicaid subsidy larger than the 
base case by directing an additional 3.76 percentage points of all income in the state for 
allocations on Medicaid relative to the base case. By contrast, California has a 3.45 percentage 
point reduction compared to the base case on aggregate for their Medicaid funding. North 
Carolina, the state in which this study was conducted, has a 0.59 percentage point cut compared 
to the base case. The z score of the North Carolina state effect is -0.67 which implies that it is not 
possible to affirm the existence of this relative tax cut at the 95% level of statistical confidence.  
The graph of the year effects is below: 
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The year effect is statistically significant for 2002, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 
2014. Most notably, the year effect looks almost identical to the year effect in the initial 
estimation of equation two. The Medicaid subsidy decreases to a relatively stable rate below the 
base case of the year 2000 from 2004 to 2011. The recession clearly negatively impacts 
Medicaid subsidies for a four year period as there are statistically significant negative year 
effects for 2008-2011. However, spending on Medicaid resumes increasing from 2011 to 2012 
and continues to increase until 2014. This rapid increase, and largest year effect, coincides with 
the passage of the Affordable Care Act. Further, as part of that law, the Medicaid expansion in 
many states fully opened in 2014 which appears to have impacted the Medicaid subsidy as this 
year has the largest increase of any year, resulting in a 0.85 percentage point increase in the 
Medicaid subsidy in the aggregate. This suggests that the state’s decision to expand Medicaid is 
crucially important to the Medicaid subsidy. This supports the theoretical model by showcasing 
the importance of the policy decisions that states make with respect to healthcare policy. 
The second iteration of the third equation is as follows:  
𝐻𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜌1 + 𝜌2𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜌3𝐻𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜌4ℎ𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜌5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜌6𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀3,𝑠,𝑡 
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Figure 7.2.2: Year Effects on the Medicaid Subsidy
(7.2.3) 
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 The results for the estimation of this model are presented in table 7.2.3. In the results for this 
estimation, the government complexion variable does not have a statistically significant 
coefficient. Government complexion does have the desired direction in that the coefficient is 
negative, agreeing with the assertion of the theoretical model that unified governments have a 
deleterious effect on healthcare coverage. However, the coefficient possesses a z score of -1.76 
which is significant at the 90% confidence level but not the desired 95% confidence level and 
therefore cannot be said to have strong statistical power. Similar to the initial estimation of this 
equation, the one year lagged healthcare coverage variable has a large statistically significant 
impact on the healthcare coverage in the current period. Also seen in this estimation and the 
initial estimation is that the one year lagged value of the bad health variable fails to be 
statistically significant. 
Three of the newly introduced control vector variables have a statistically significant impact 
on healthcare coverage. The unemployment rate has a significant negative impact on healthcare 
coverage, the share of the population who are above the age of 50 has a significant positive 
impact, and the population in millions has a statistically significant positive impact on health 
coverage. Each of these results lead to intuitive conclusions. As the unemployment rate in a state 
increases, the share of the population eligible for Medicaid increases as the share of people with 
no employment increases. However, these people do not all enroll in Medicaid and therefore the 
health coverage figure decreases. Additionally, the elderly face an added incentive to sign up for 
healthcare and therefore the older a state is, the higher its participation rate in Medicaid. Finally, 
as the population of a state increases, it has a higher concentration of people eligible for 
Medicaid in urban areas and it is therefore easier to reach these people which increases 
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healthcare coverage. Neither the state nor year effects are particularly remarkable nor do they 
feature an overarching pattern.  
The second iteration of the fourth equation is as follows:  
ℎ𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜔1 + 𝜔2𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔3ℎ𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜔4𝐻𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔5𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑡
+ 𝜔7𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀4,𝑠,𝑡 
 The results for the estimation of this model are shown in table 7.2.4. This equation once 
again features a partial breakdown of the theoretical model. The theoretical model supposed that 
healthcare coverage and healthcare spending were each key determinant of health outcomes. 
However, this estimation refutes that assertion as healthcare coverage fails to have a statistically 
significant impact on the fraction of residents in a state who report to have bad health. In fact, in 
this estimation only five variables; the health of Medicaid enrollees in the previous period, the 
Medicaid subsidy, the share of the adult population between the ages of 18 and 30, the share of 
the population who are aged 50 and older, and the population of the state itself, have statistically 
significant impacts on the health of those on Medicaid in the current year. 
 The statistically significant coefficient on the health of Medicaid enrollees in the previous 
period is a similar result to the one seen in the first estimation of this equation. The share of 
enrollees reporting poor health in the current period is related to the share of the enrollees who 
report poor health in the previous period. Also similar to before is the coefficient on the 
Medicaid subsidy variable. In this iteration of the model the coefficient is -0.2576 which means 
that each one percentage point increase in the Medicaid subsidy results in a 0.2576 percentage 
point reduction in the population enrolled in Medicaid who report poor health. This is a key 
result that underscores the importance of the decisions that state governments make. Medicaid 
policy at the state level has an impact beyond its fiscal implications. These decisions that the 
(7.2.4) 
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states make with respect to their Medicaid programs have real consequences for the citizens of 
these states that impact their physical wellbeing. The newly significant variables seen in the 
control vector suggest that three key assertions are true: younger states are healthier, older states 
are less healthy, and larger states have less healthy Medicaid enrollees. The state and year effects 
for this estimation are in table 7.2.4.1. The state effects show a slightly different outcome than 
previously seen. After controlling for all the independent variables and the year effects, West 
Virginia still posts the worst health outcomes for its Medicaid enrollees, but now California has 
by far the best healthcare outcomes for their Medicaid enrollees rather than Minnesota. North 
Carolina has 13.20 percentage point decrease in the share of Medicaid enrollees who report poor 
health compared to the base case, this effect is statistically significant with a z score of -6.19. 
The year effects are similar as to those seen in the first iteration of this equation, the health 
outcomes for Medicaid enrollees have improved since the year 2000. Those outcomes do not 
show a constant linear pattern but do improve gradually.  
The year effects are graphed below: 
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Figure 7.2.4: The Year Effects on Health Outcomes
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 This figure highlights how the health of those enrolled in Medicaid has been steadily 
getting better over the course of the sample. The figure shows how, over time, the share of 
Medicaid enrollees who report bad health has been decreasing. This suggests that throughout this 
period the Medicaid program improved the health of its enrollees nationally. The interesting 
aspect of this figure is the fact that the share of Medicaid enrollees reporting bad health increased 
during the recession. The result here seems to suggest that the health of Medicaid enrollees 
decreases during periods of economic hardship but the reasons for that decrease are unclear and 
could inspire further study to determine how recessions impact the health of those already 
enrolled in welfare programs. 
 In the first two sets of estimations each piece of the theoretical model is considered in 
isolation. These estimations highlight the connections, or lack thereof, that are asserted by the 
theoretical model when each relationship is considered independently. For the analysis of the 
theoretical model to be complete, all aspects of the theoretical model must be considered at one 
time in a simultaneous estimation of all four equations at once. This is accomplished by a 
simultaneous two stage least squares regression of all four equations. This estimation will once 
again occur in two parts, once without the control vector and once with the control vector. 
Iteration number three performs the simultaneous regression with neither the control vector nor 
the expand vector, using the following equations:  
𝜏𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2% 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀1,𝑠,𝑡 
𝑠𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2% 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑠,𝑡 
𝐻𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜌1 + 𝜌2𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜌3𝐻𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜌4ℎ𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜀3,𝑠,𝑡 
ℎ𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜔1 + 𝜔2𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔3ℎ𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜔4𝐻𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔5𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀4,𝑠,𝑡 
(7.3.1) 
(7.3.2) 
(7.3.3) 
(7.3.4) 
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 The results of this estimation are in tables 7.3.1 through 7.3.5 in the appendix. The results 
of this estimation no longer support the theoretical model for the first equation in that many 
results lack statistical significance. However, even though many variables fail to have 
statistically significant coefficients, all of the estimations for each equation have F-statistics 
which are powerfully statistically significant. None of the equations have an F-statistic whose 
probability of randomly occurring is more than 0.0001. In the estimation of equation one, 
government complexion still has a positive coefficient but it is no longer statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level. The theoretical model posited that government complexion would 
increase the tax rate but this fails to materialize at the appropriate confidence level. This equation 
also no longer displays the expected relationship between poverty and taxation. The percentage 
of a state’s residents in poverty has also lost its significance at the 95% confidence level. It is 
useful to note that for each of these variables the sign of the coefficient aligns with the 
theoretical model. This is particularly true for the government complexion variable which has a 
coefficient with a z-score of 1.83, significant at the 90% confidence level but not the 95% level. 
This coefficient possesses a positive sign which is the desired relationship in the theoretical 
model and it is an encouraging result despite the fact that it is not statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level. 
 The second equation also fails to possess a statistically significant coefficient on 
government complexion. This result contradicts the theoretical model which maintained that 
divided government would result in an increase in the amount that the state spends on Medicaid. 
In that case, it was expected that the coefficient on government complexion would be negative 
and that it would be large as it was posited that the effect on spending was substantial. The 
results here show that the sign on the coefficient is positive and the coefficient fails to be 
54 
 
statistically significant. It is useful to compare these results to the results of the first iteration of 
these estimations when they were estimated as individual stand-alone equations. When estimated 
simultaneously in this, the third iteration, the government complexion variable loses statistical 
significance. The coefficient on the government complexion decreases from the standalone 
estimation to the simultaneous estimation. In the initial estimation this variable was statistically 
significant with a coefficient of 0.0065, but in this third iteration, the coefficient is much smaller 
at 0.0011. The standard errors decrease in this third iteration from 0.0016 to 0.0011. The 
decrease in the standard errors is not substantial enough that the results maintain their statistical 
significance in this third iteration. The poverty rate in the state fails to have a statistically 
significant effect on healthcare spending. Similar to previous iterations of this model, it was 
theorized that as a state is increasingly impoverished, the state’s Medicaid subsidy increases. 
Similar to government complexion, the poverty rate variable sees its coefficient and standard 
error decrease from model one to model three. The difference in the standard errors is relatively 
small though, which contributes to the variable losing its statistical impact upon the recalibration 
of the model.  
 The significance and magnitude of the state effects and the year effects are still present 
and are relatively consistent with their previous values. These are contained in table 7.3.2.1. 
After controlling for government complexion and the percent of residents in poverty, 
Massachusetts has the highest Medicaid subsidy, with an additional 2.51 percentage point 
premium in this iteration of the model. North Dakota has the steepest discount on Medicaid 
subsidies with a 1.23 percentage point discount relative to the base case. California has a 
statistically insignificant year effect of a 0.59 percentage point decrease in the Medicaid subsidy 
relative to the base case. North Carolina has a statistically insignificant effect as well with a 0.37 
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percentage point increase in Medicaid subsidies relative to Alabama. Year effects fail to have 
any trend with only 2002 having a statistically significant year effect. 
 Equation three finds no statistically significant variables relating to the theoretical model.  
The theoretical model posited that unified government would decrease healthcare coverage in a 
state. Government complexion fails to have a statistically significant coefficient. The statistically 
significant variable in this model is the health coverage in the previous period. This variable has 
a coefficient of 0.4358 and a z score of 12.40. Similar to the previous result, health coverage in 
the prior period is quite important to the health coverage in the current period. The health of 
those enrolled in Medicaid once again fails to be statistically significant as was also seen in 
previous iterations of this equation. 
 The fourth equation now utterly fails to support the theoretical model. In the theory 
previously stated, healthcare spending and healthcare coverage would each provide explanatory 
power for the health of individuals on Medicaid. The simultaneous estimation of this equation 
agrees with the stand-alone estimation that the coefficient on both of those variables fails to 
deviate from zero at the 95% confidence level. Of all the variables included in this estimation, 
only the health of the Medicaid enrollees in that state in the prior period has a statistically 
significant impact on the health of Medicaid enrollees in the current year. After taking into 
account the model’s independent variables, of all the states examined, North Dakota now posts 
the best health outcomes for their Medicaid enrollees and Kentucky takes over the ignominy of 
the worst health outcomes from West Virginia (table 7.3.4.1). North Carolina has a statistically 
insignificant state effect of a 4.87 percentage point reduction in the share of a state’s Medicaid 
enrollees with poor health. California has a statistically significant 20.89 percentage point 
reduction in the share of its Medicaid enrollees who report bad health. 
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(7.4.2) 
The fourth iteration of the model is a second set of simultaneous regressions. This is very 
similar to the second iteration of the model but there is a significant addition to this iteration 
compared to the earlier iterations. This iteration includes Medicaid subsidies as an independent 
variable in determining the overall tax rate and the overall tax rate as an independent variable for 
the Medicaid subsidy. To correct for the fact that this relationship is both theoretical and in the 
budget constraint, the school children variable is also present in this iteration as it was earlier. 
This is because states spend much of their tax revenue on public education. This will serve to 
proxy the amount the state spends on other programs besides Medicaid which will add a variable 
to the determination of the tax equation not seen in the Medicaid subsidy equation which will 
improve the robustness of the estimation. Including tax rates in equation two and the Medicaid 
subsidy in equation one is allowed in this setting because the method of two stage simultaneous 
regression will correct for the bias due to the simultaneity of those two variables, unlike previous 
methods. The second simultaneous regression is the simultaneous regression with the control 
vector and expand vector, the equations are below:  
𝜏𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑠,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀1,𝑠,𝑡 
𝑠𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝜏𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾3% 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀2,𝑠,𝑡 
𝐻𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜌1 + 𝜌2𝐺𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜌3𝐻𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜌4ℎ𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜌5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜌6𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀3,𝑠,𝑡 
ℎ𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜔1 + 𝜔2𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔3ℎ𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜔4𝐻𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔5𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜔7𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑡
+ 𝜀4,𝑠,𝑡 
The results of this regression are seen in tables 7.4.1 through 7.4.5.1. When the model is 
calibrated this way, the significance of all the variables save for the Medicaid subsidy and the 
(7.4.1) 
(7.4.3) 
(7.4.4) 
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government complexion variable fail to have statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. 
Similar to the third iteration, all of the equations have substantially large F-statistics which have 
a probability of randomly occurring less than 0.0001. This indicates that the estimation of each 
equation has statistical power. A key result of this iteration, and indeed the entire study, is that it 
appears that unified government, aligned with the assertion of the theoretical model, increases 
the tax rate in a state by 0.69 percentage points. This result is independent of the size of the 
Medicaid subsidy due to the calibration of this estimation. This is the largest such coefficient in 
this equation in any iteration of the model. The strongest affirmation of the theoretical model in 
the paper is seen in this estimation. Unified government complexion has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the tax rate in a state as the z score is 2.09 which is the exact 
relationship the theoretical model anticipated. Government complexion has a coefficient of 
0.0069 which means that a unified government raises taxes by 0.69 percentage points. The 
Medicaid subsidy has a statistically significant impact on the overall tax rate. For each one 
percentage point increase in the Medicaid subsidy, the overall tax rate increases by 2.63 
percentage points. This implies that Medicaid subsidies and the overall tax rate have a positive 
relationship which is aligned with the budget constraint the state faces.  
The only statistically significant result of the simultaneous estimate of the second 
equation is the coefficient on the tax variable. The state and the year effects are also statistically 
significant. These effects are seen in table 7.4.2.1. Government complexion and the percent in 
poverty all fail to be statistically significant. Government complexion has a negative sign, the 
desired direction according to the thesis, but the z score is -1.40 and therefore this result is not 
statistically significant at a reasonable level of confidence. The percent in poverty has a positive 
sign but the coefficient and z-score are each almost zero. The z score for the percent in poverty is 
58 
 
a paltry 0.12. The coefficient on tax rate, which has a statistically significant impact, is 0.2486 
which implies that for every one percentage point increase in a state’s tax rate, the state adds an 
additional 0.25 percentage points to the tax rate to fund its Medicaid program. This result 
supports the theoretical model in that there is a strong relationship between the two tax rates. 
After allowing for the impact of the other variables in this estimation, Ohio is the state with the 
highest Medicaid subsidy state effect, 2.10 percentage points above the base case in this 
estimation. Hawaii has the lowest Medicaid subsidies in the country 2.65 percentage points 
below the base case. California has a 1.45 percentage point discount relative to Alabama, the 
base case, but that result is not statistically significant. North Carolina similarly fails to have a 
statistically significant result. North Carolina’s state effect is a 0.20 percentage point decrease 
relative to the base case in this estimation of the model. Five of the year effects, 2002, 2003, 
2007, 2012 and 2013 are statistically significant but there is not a clear trend in the year effects 
other than the fact that all year effects in this estimation of this equation are positive. 
The results of this estimation for the third equation are statistically significant coefficients on 
the one year lag of health coverage and the share of the adult population over age 50. The 
theoretical model said that government complexion contributed to healthcare coverage, but that 
relationship fails to materialize in this estimation. Moreover, the z-score is 0.11 which possesses 
essentially zero statistical power. Compared to the estimation in iteration two, whose equation 
most closely resembles the relationship estimated here, the coefficient for government 
complexion has grown. Previously, government complexion had a negative coefficient which 
was statistically significant at the 90% confidence level but not the 95% confidence level. In this 
final iteration of the model, the government complexion coefficient is positive and quite close to 
zero. This leads to the conclusion that there is not a reasonable level of statistical confidence at 
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which it can be concluded that the coefficient on government complexion, and therefore 
government complexion’s marginal effect as it relates to Medicaid coverage, is not equal to zero. 
The lagged value of health coverage is still significant in this estimation as it has been 
previously. This variable has a coefficient which is quite close in magnitude to its value in the 
initial estimation seen in the second iteration. The significance of the variable on the share of the 
population who are old implies that as a state has more old citizens, they enroll in the healthcare 
programs available to them which increases healthcare coverage. This result was also seen in 
previous iterations of this equation. 
 The simultaneous estimation of the fourth equation with the control vector included 
refutes the theoretical model yet again. The desired relationship of health outcomes to healthcare 
spending and healthcare coverage fails to materialize at an acceptable level of statistical 
significance when the coefficients are examined. In fact, there are no statistically significant 
results of coefficients on the independent variables examined in this estimation. All variables, 
including those that were previously statistically significant, fail to have coefficients which pass 
the test of statistical significance in this estimation. Further, the loss of statistical significance is 
not exclusively due to the enlargement of the standard errors, the coefficients also undergo 
significant changes. The Medicaid subsidy sees its coefficient change from -0.2578 in the second 
iteration of this equation to 3.1612 in the fourth iteration. Simultaneously, the standard error 
drastically increases from 0.1241 to 4.2755. These changes are quite large and this leads to the 
conclusion that this relationship fails to materialize. The change to the healthcare coverage 
variable is similarly uninformative. In the second iteration, healthcare coverage did not have a 
statistically significant coefficient. The coefficient in that estimation is 0.0042 with a standard 
error of 0.292 and in this fourth iteration of the model the coefficient is -0.1225 with a standard 
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error of 0.1684. Here the standard errors decrease between iterations but the sign on the 
coefficient changes. Further, neither coefficient is significant in their respective estimations. The 
confluence of these facts weakens any potential case that could be made for the existence of a 
statistically significant and directionally persistent relationship between healthcare coverage and 
health outcomes for Medicaid enrollees. Therefore that assertion of the theoretical model must be 
refuted. The results of the estimation do indicate that the Medicaid subsidy has a substantial 
impact on the share of Medicaid enrollees with poor health. The coefficient for this variable is by 
far the largest coefficient of any variable in this model which suggests that the Medicaid subsidy 
has a large impact on the share of the population on Medicaid who report poor health. However, 
the standard errors are quite large which means that it is not possible to say that the effect is 
different from zero with statistical confidence.  
The theoretical model stated that state government complexion would have an impact on 
the health outcomes of those enrolled in Medicaid in that state. Although none of these 
relationships are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, it is useful to examine what 
type of relationship exists between government complexion and health outcomes for Medicaid 
enrollees. In this final iteration, government complexion has a positive effect on healthcare 
coverage which in turn has a negative impact on the share of the Medicaid enrollees who report 
bad health. As seen through healthcare coverage, unified governments actually improve the 
healthcare outcomes of those on Medicaid. The same results is apparent through the sizing of the 
Medicaid subsidy. Government complexion has a negative impact on the size of the Medicaid 
subsidy and the size of the subsidy has a positive impact on the share of Medicaid enrollees who 
report bad health. Therefore this iteration suggests that unified governments reduce the share of 
Medicaid enrollees who report bad health. If these relationships appeared at a sufficient level of 
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statistical significance, then this would actually refute the thesis by suggesting that the opposite 
effect occurs in reality. As it stands, these relationships lack statistical significance, and so it is 
not possible to actually make these determinations. However, it is interesting that the relationship 
that these factors are closest to indicating is the opposite of what was theorized. 
 The state and year effects for this estimation of equation four are in table 7.4.5.1. The 
state effects are essentially aligned with how they were in the stand-alone estimation of this 
equation. When controlling for the independent variables, West Virginia posts the worst health 
outcomes for its Medicaid enrollees, and California sports best healthcare outcomes for their 
Medicaid enrollees. North Carolina has a 13.74 percentage point reduction in its share of 
Medicaid enrollees who report poor health compared to the base case in this estimation. The year 
effects from this estimation are quite different as only 2003 has statistically significant effects.  
VIII. Conclusion 
This thesis asserted that divided state governments improve health outcomes of Medicaid 
participants in states through their taxation and healthcare spending policies as compared to 
unified governments. After an econometric examination of a system of equations mapping this 
thesis, that hypothesis seems to be unsupported by the preponderance of data on the subject. 
Specifically, this paper examined four relationships: the impact of government complexion on 
tax revenue per capita, the impact of government complexion and tax revenue per capita on 
healthcare spending, the impact of government complexion on healthcare coverage, and the 
impact of healthcare coverage and healthcare spending on healthcare outcomes. This study also 
looked at whether or not states decided to expand Medicaid and the confluence of that decision 
with government complexion. These relationships were estimated as stand-alone equations and 
then as a simultaneous system of equations and each of these estimations was performed with 
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and without variables that control for the background conditions in each state. Results that at first 
appear significant fail to maintain their significance in each iteration of the model, with no single 
result consistently passing a robust test of statistical significance. After conducting a rigorous 
investigation of these equations, all but one of the theoretical relationships posited by the thesis 
fail to materialize. Relationships that initially appear significant when estimated on their own, 
such as the impact of the Medicaid subsidy on Medicaid enrollees’ health outcomes, phase out 
when the equations are estimated simultaneously. There are several results that maintain their 
significance across both the simultaneous and stand-alone estimations of the model but these are 
not part of the theoretical model. The key finding of this paper is the fact that the partisan 
composition of state governments significantly impacts the overall tax rate in a state. This result 
appears in the most sophisticated of all the estimations and appears at the 95% confidence level. 
Both other theorized relationships, the partisan complexion of state governments impacts 
Medicaid subsidization and healthcare coverage fail to materialize. The partisan complexion of 
state governments therefore has no impact through these factors on the health of a state’s 
Medicaid enrollees. The theory of this paper was based on the notion that state governments have 
a large impact on the health outcomes in their state and that they can alter the health in the state 
through policy. Further, this paper asserted that these alterations to health outcomes could be 
observed in a fairly short amounts of time. As the results contained herein show, these 
assumptions fail to hold up when subjected to rigorous analysis. Instead of displaying a rigorous 
relationship between state government complexion, policy and ultimately health outcomes, this 
paper suggests that state governments do not have a discernable effect on the health outcomes of 
their citizens on Medicaid, but rather that they only alter overall taxation rates. 
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Appendix: Tables 
 
Table 7.1.1:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs  Chi2 P > | Chi2 | 
Tax Rate 735  2832.92 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
GC 0.0065 0.0016 3.94 0.000 
Percent in Poverty 0.2171 0.0440 4.93 0.000 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the stand-alone regression of 
the first equation without controls. The estimation controls for state and year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 7.1.2:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs  Chi2 P > | Chi2 | 
Medicaid subsidy 735  1140.29 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
GC 0.0011 0.0005 2.34 0.020 
Percent in Poverty 0.0416 0.0130 3.19 0.001 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the stand-alone regression of 
the second equation without controls. The estimation controls for state and year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 7.1.2.1:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs  Chi2 P > | Chi2 | 
Medicaid subsidy 735  1140.29 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
Alaska -0.0127 0.0097 -1.30 0.192 
Arizona -0.0177 0.0074 -2.39 0.017 
Arkansas -0.0132 0.0069 -1.90 0.057 
California -0.0134 0.0070 -1.91 0.056 
Colorado -0.0107 0.0071 -1.52 0.129 
Connecticut -0.0042 0.0089 -0.48 0.633 
Delaware -0.0051 0.0069 -0.73 0.464 
Florida -0.0193 0.0110 -1.76 0.079 
Georgia -0.0085 0.0070 -1.21 0.225 
Hawaii -0.0040 0.0076 -0.52 0.601 
Idaho -0.0136 0.0070 -1.94 0.052 
Illinois 0.0112 0.0157 0.71 0.477 
Indiana -0.0040 0.0070 -0.57 0.567 
Iowa 0.0124 0.0120 1.04 0.300 
Kansas -0.0117 0.0070 -1.68 0.093 
Kentucky 0.0207 0.0251 0.83 0.408 
Louisiana -0.0151 0.0071 -2.12 0.034 
Maine -0.0084 0.0070 -1.20 0.231 
Maryland 0.0029 0.0096 0.30 0.765 
Massachusetts 0.0168 0.0154 1.09 0.277 
Michigan 0.0010 0.0096 0.10 0.920 
Minnesota -0.0093 0.0074 -1.25 0.210 
Mississippi -0.0179 0.0071 -2.50 0.012 
Missouri -0.0028 0.0073 -0.38 0.703 
Montana -0.0111 0.0074 -1.50 0.133 
Nevada -0.0118 0.0070 -1.69 0.091 
New Hampshire -0.0160 0.0072 -2.22 0.027 
New Jersey -0.0106 0.0072 -1.48 0.139 
New Mexico -0.0188 0.0072 -2.60 0.009 
New York -0.0042 0.0070 -0.60 0.547 
North Carolina -0.0023 0.0075 -0.31 0.757 
North Dakota -0.0197 0.0072 -2.76 0.006 
Ohio 0.0107 0.0074 1.44 0.150 
Oklahoma -0.0106 0.0071 -1.49 0.137 
Oregon 0.0136 0.0076 1.79 0.074 
Pennsylvania 0.0046 0.0070 0.65 0.513 
Rhode Island -0.0108 0.0108 -1.00 0.318 
South Carolina -0.0154 0.0082 -1.87 0.062 
South Dakota 0.0038 0.0075 0.50 0.617 
Tennessee -0.0208 0.0075 -2.79 0.005 
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Texas 0.0023 0.0074 0.31 0.760 
Utah -0.0138 0.0070 -1.97 0.049 
Vermont -0.0129 0.0071 -1.83 0.068 
Virginia -0.0026 0.0071 -0.36 0.720 
Washington -0.0078 0.0072 -1.09 0.276 
West Virginia -0.0128 0.0069 -1.85 0.065 
Wisconsin -0.0084 0.0070 -1.20 0.231 
Wyoming -0.0148 0.0070 -2.12 0.034 
2001 0.0000 0.0008 0.03 0.974 
2002 0.0041 0.0009 4.67 0.000 
2003 0.0033 0.0009 3.66 0.000 
2004 -0.0027 0.0009 -2.98 0.003 
2005 -0.0009 0.0009 -0.94 0.348 
2006 -0.0024 0.0009 -2.68 0.007 
2007 -0.0010 0.0009 -1.10 0.271 
2008 -0.0019 0.0009 -2.09 0.037 
2009 -0.0022 0.0009 -2.34 0.019 
2010 -0.0019 0.0010 -2.00 0.046 
2011 -0.0030 0.0010 -3.00 0.003 
2012 0.0008 0.0010 0.84 0.398 
2013 0.0006 0.0010 0.62 0.537 
2014 0.0096 0.0010 9.68 0.000 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the stand-alone regression of 
the second equation without controls, state and year effects. The estimation controls 
for state and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.1.3:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs  Chi2 P > | Chi2 | 
Health Coverage 735  2077.46 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
GC -0.0053 0.0025 -2.16 0.031 
H in t-1 0.4485 0.0316 14.21 0.000 
h in t-1 -0.0014 0.0189 -0.08 0.940 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the stand-alone regression of 
the third equation without controls. The estimation controls for state and year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 7.1.4:  
  
Dependent Variable Number of Obs  Chi2 P > | Chi2 | 
Bad Health 686  3088.25 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
s -0.2671 0.1223 -2.18 0.029 
h in t-1 0.0971 0.0348 2.79 0.005 
H 0.0333 0.0289 1.15 0.250 
Personal Income 0.0753 0.0442 1.70 0.089 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the stand-alone regression of 
the fourth equation without controls. The estimation controls for state and year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 7.1.4.1:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs  Chi2 P > | Chi2 | 
Bad Health 686  3088.25 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
Alaska -0.1969 0.0245 -8.03 0.000 
Arizona -0.2177 0.0150 -14.50 0.000 
Arkansas -0.0614 0.0194 -3.16 0.002 
California -0.2307 0.0192 -12.03 0.000 
Colorado -0.1697 0.0178 -9.55 0.000 
Connecticut -0.2368 0.0298 -7.95 0.000 
Delaware -0.2183 0.0259 -8.43 0.000 
Florida -0.1435 0.0157 -9.16 0.000 
Georgia -0.1244 0.0203 -6.11 0.000 
Hawaii -0.2240 0.0184 -12.16 0.000 
Idaho -0.1743 0.0169 -10.34 0.000 
Illinois -0.2332 0.0230 -10.15 0.000 
Indiana -0.1646 0.0157 -10.49 0.000 
Iowa -0.2186 0.0209 -10.47 0.000 
Kansas -0.1196 0.0169 -7.10 0.000 
Kentucky -0.0287 0.0129 -2.23 0.026 
Louisiana -0.0895 0.0176 -5.08 0.000 
Maine -0.1875 0.0149 -12.55 0.000 
Maryland -0.1595 0.0273 -5.85 0.000 
Massachusetts -0.2365 0.0274 -8.64 0.000 
Michigan -0.1634 0.0150 -10.92 0.000 
Minnesota -0.2809 0.0191 -14.71 0.000 
Mississippi -0.0361 0.0144 -2.50 0.012 
Missouri -0.1437 0.0449 -3.20 0.001 
Montana -0.1404 0.0174 -8.05 0.000 
Nevada -0.1857 0.0174 -10.68 0.000 
New Hampshire -0.2023 0.0298 -6.79 0.000 
New Jersey -0.2081 0.0247 -8.41 0.000 
New Mexico -0.1719 0.0180 -9.54 0.000 
New York -0.2219 0.0314 -7.06 0.000 
North Carolina -0.0970 0.0162 -5.99 0.000 
North Dakota -0.2515 0.0224 -11.23 0.000 
Ohio -0.1700 0.0143 -11.90 0.000 
Oklahoma -0.0951 0.0157 -6.05 0.000 
Oregon -0.1789 0.0146 -12.22 0.000 
Pennsylvania -0.1327 0.0164 -8.11 0.000 
Rhode Island -0.2240 0.0198 -11.32 0.000 
South Carolina -0.0568 0.0156 -3.63 0.000 
South Dakota -0.1918 0.0288 -6.66 0.000 
Tennessee -0.1047 0.0170 -6.15 0.000 
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Texas -0.1236 0.0160 -7.74 0.000 
Utah -0.2053 0.0208 -9.85 0.000 
Vermont -0.2635 0.0184 -14.30 0.000 
Virginia -0.1431 0.0269 -5.32 0.000 
Washington -0.2099 0.0227 -9.25 0.000 
West Virginia 0.0280 0.0135 2.08 0.038 
Wisconsin -0.2547 0.0167 -15.22 0.000 
Wyoming -0.1922 0.0202 -9.49 0.000 
2001 -0.0012 0.0075 -0.16 0.871 
2002 -0.0189 0.0077 -2.45 0.014 
2003 -0.0366 0.0082 -4.49 0.000 
2004 -0.0349 0.0093 -3.74 0.000 
2005 -0.0339 0.0105 -3.22 0.001 
2006 -0.0343 0.0125 -2.75 0.006 
2007 -0.0459 0.0141 -3.25 0.001 
2008 -0.0308 0.0155 -1.99 0.046 
2009 -0.0342 0.0140 -2.44 0.015 
2010 -0.0628 0.0149 -4.21 0.000 
2011 -0.0643 0.0169 -3.80 0.000 
2012 -0.0605 0.0186 -3.24 0.001 
2013 -0.0599 0.0188 -3.18 0.001 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the stand-alone regression of 
the fourth equation without controls, state and year effects. The estimation controls 
for state and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.2.1:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs  Chi2 P > | Chi2 | 
Tax Rate 735  1925.99 0 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
Schoolchildren Average 0.0277 0.0237 1.17 0.244 
GC 0.0055 0.0021 2.67 0.008 
Percent in Poverty 0.1517 0.0619 2.45 0.014 
Gini 0.1023 0.0520 1.97 0.049 
Unemployment Rate 0.0017 0.0012 1.42 0.155 
Young 0.0194 0.0675 0.29 0.774 
Old 0.0150 0.0623 0.24 0.810 
% Male 0.0681 0.0925 0.74 0.461 
% White -0.0115 0.0544 -0.21 0.833 
Population 0.0025 0.0016 1.57 0.117 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the stand-alone regression of 
the first equation with controls and expand vectors. The estimation controls for state 
and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.2.2:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs  Chi2 P > | Chi2 | 
Medicaid Subsidy 735  1145.62 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
GC 0.0014 0.0005 2.87 0.004 
Percent in Poverty 0.0226 0.0146 1.55 0.120 
Gini 0.0215 0.0127 1.69 0.092 
Unemployment Rate 0.0005 0.0003 1.62 0.105 
Young 0.0076 0.0135 0.56 0.572 
Old -0.0042 0.0124 -0.34 0.734 
% Male 0.0170 0.0229 0.74 0.458 
% White -0.0014 0.0127 -0.11 0.912 
Population 0.0006 0.0008 0.74 0.461 
Medicaid Expansion -0.0002 0.0025 -0.09 0.925 
Interaction of GC and ME 0.0004 0.0026 0.15 0.880 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the stand-alone regression of 
the second equation with controls and expand vectors. The estimation controls for 
state and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.2.2.1:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs  Chi2 P > | Chi2 | 
Medicaid subsidy 735  1145.62 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
Alaska -0.0123 0.0095 -1.30 0.194 
Arizona -0.0190 0.0083 -2.28 0.023 
Arkansas -0.0119 0.0078 -1.52 0.129 
California -0.0350 0.0266 -1.31 0.189 
Colorado -0.0125 0.0083 -1.50 0.134 
Connecticut -0.0048 0.0093 -0.51 0.607 
Delaware -0.0029 0.0082 -0.36 0.720 
Florida -0.0275 0.0153 -1.80 0.072 
Georgia -0.0117 0.0086 -1.35 0.176 
Hawaii -0.0031 0.0103 -0.30 0.762 
Idaho -0.0130 0.0087 -1.49 0.136 
Illinois 0.0015 0.0149 0.10 0.920 
Indiana -0.0055 0.0082 -0.67 0.502 
Iowa 0.0134 0.0127 1.06 0.289 
Kansas -0.0113 0.0081 -1.39 0.163 
Kentucky 0.0185 0.0196 0.94 0.346 
Louisiana -0.0150 0.0078 -1.93 0.053 
Maine -0.0064 0.0087 -0.73 0.465 
Maryland 0.0012 0.0101 0.12 0.907 
Massachusetts 0.0145 0.0158 0.92 0.359 
Michigan -0.0284 0.0149 -1.90 0.057 
Minnesota -0.0104 0.0086 -1.22 0.224 
Mississippi -0.0171 0.0080 -2.15 0.031 
Missouri -0.0044 0.0083 -0.53 0.596 
Montana -0.0085 0.0090 -0.94 0.346 
Nevada -0.0120 0.0082 -1.46 0.144 
New Hampshire -0.0144 0.0088 -1.64 0.101 
New Jersey 0.0376 0.0951 0.40 0.692 
New Mexico -0.0168 0.0086 -1.94 0.052 
New York -0.0137 0.0140 -0.98 0.326 
North Carolina -0.0059 0.0089 -0.67 0.505 
North Dakota -0.0172 0.0089 -1.93 0.054 
Ohio 0.0057 0.0100 0.57 0.570 
Oklahoma -0.0101 0.0079 -1.29 0.197 
Oregon 0.0126 0.0087 1.45 0.148 
Pennsylvania -0.0012 0.0103 -0.11 0.909 
Rhode Island -0.0086 0.0098 -0.87 0.384 
South Carolina -0.0151 0.0084 -1.80 0.072 
South Dakota 0.0045 0.0086 0.52 0.601 
Tennessee -0.0226 0.0085 -2.66 0.008 
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Texas -0.0105 0.0176 -0.60 0.549 
Utah -0.0148 0.0085 -1.74 0.082 
Vermont -0.0098 0.0090 -1.08 0.279 
Virginia -0.0050 0.0082 -0.61 0.543 
Washington -0.0109 0.0081 -1.33 0.182 
West Virginia -0.0106 0.0086 -1.24 0.216 
Wisconsin -0.0096 0.0082 -1.17 0.242 
Wyoming -0.0124 0.0089 -1.40 0.163 
2001 -0.0006 0.0011 -0.62 0.538 
2002 0.0029 0.0012 2.55 0.011 
2003 0.0019 0.0012 1.60 0.110 
2004 -0.0035 0.0012 -2.99 0.003 
2005 -0.0012 0.0011 -1.02 0.306 
2006 -0.0026 0.0011 -2.30 0.021 
2007 -0.0012 0.0011 -1.08 0.282 
2008 -0.0023 0.0012 -1.91 0.056 
2009 -0.0042 0.0017 -2.45 0.014 
2010 -0.0039 0.0018 -2.24 0.025 
2011 -0.0045 0.0016 -2.72 0.006 
2012 -0.0007 0.0016 -0.42 0.678 
2013 -0.0007 0.0015 -0.45 0.655 
2014 0.0085 0.0015 5.86 0.000 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the stand-alone regression of 
the second equation with controls and expand vectors, state and year effects. The 
estimation controls for state and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.2.3:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs  Chi2 P > | Chi2 | 
Healthcare Coverage 735  2028.39 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
GC -0.0046 0.0026 -1.76 0.078 
H in t-1 0.4423 0.0312 14.20 0.000 
h in t-1 0.0021 0.0193 0.11 0.915 
Gini -0.0351 0.0721 -0.49 0.626 
Unemployment Rate -0.0034 0.0013 -2.58 0.010 
Young 0.0145 0.0782 0.19 0.853 
Old 0.2166 0.0725 2.99 0.003 
% Male -0.0307 0.1378 -0.22 0.824 
% White 0.0923 0.0664 1.39 0.164 
Population 0.0078 0.0030 2.62 0.009 
Medicaid Expansion 0.0348 0.0115 3.03 0.002 
Interaction of GC and ME -0.0002 0.0122 -0.02 0.984 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the stand-alone regression of 
the third equation with controls and expand vectors. The estimation controls for state 
and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.2.4:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs  Chi2 P > | Chi2 | 
Bad Health 686  3187.07 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
s -0.2576 0.1242 -2.07 0.038 
h in t-1 0.0968 0.0342 2.83 0.005 
H 0.0042 0.0292 0.14 0.885 
Personal Income 0.0560 0.0554 1.01 0.312 
Gini 0.0481 0.1053 0.46 0.648 
Unemployment Rate -0.0019 0.0024 -0.81 0.420 
Young -0.3209 0.1146 -2.80 0.005 
Old 0.2386 0.1158 2.06 0.039 
% Male 0.2613 0.2059 1.27 0.204 
% White -0.0479 0.0905 -0.53 0.597 
Population 0.0093 0.0029 3.19 0.001 
Medicaid Expansion -0.0077 0.0087 -0.89 0.373 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the stand-alone regression of 
the fourth equation with controls and expand vectors. The estimation controls for 
state and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.2.4.1:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs  Chi2 P > | Chi2 | 
Bad Health 686  3187.07 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
Alaska -0.1507 0.0294 -5.12 0.000 
Arizona -0.2110 0.0253 -8.34 0.000 
Arkansas -0.0357 0.0232 -1.54 0.124 
California -0.4971 0.0954 -5.21 0.000 
Colorado -0.1516 0.0284 -5.33 0.000 
Connecticut -0.2178 0.0387 -5.63 0.000 
Delaware -0.1770 0.0321 -5.52 0.000 
Florida -0.2632 0.0442 -5.96 0.000 
Georgia -0.1519 0.0254 -5.99 0.000 
Hawaii -0.2164 0.0454 -4.77 0.000 
Idaho -0.1212 0.0322 -3.77 0.000 
Illinois -0.2883 0.0350 -8.23 0.000 
Indiana -0.1703 0.0249 -6.83 0.000 
Iowa -0.1855 0.0326 -5.70 0.000 
Kansas -0.0806 0.0259 -3.12 0.002 
Kentucky -0.0064 0.0243 -0.26 0.791 
Louisiana -0.0815 0.0194 -4.21 0.000 
Maine -0.1551 0.0317 -4.90 0.000 
Maryland -0.1753 0.0281 -6.23 0.000 
Massachusetts -0.2391 0.0347 -6.89 0.000 
Michigan -0.2002 0.0256 -7.83 0.000 
Minnesota -0.2655 0.0284 -9.35 0.000 
Mississippi -0.0239 0.0185 -1.29 0.196 
Missouri -0.1377 0.0521 -2.64 0.008 
Montana -0.1072 0.0297 -3.62 0.000 
Nevada -0.1482 0.0240 -6.18 0.000 
New Hampshire -0.1689 0.0421 -4.01 0.000 
New Jersey -0.2357 0.0319 -7.40 0.000 
New Mexico -0.1421 0.0255 -5.57 0.000 
New York -0.3423 0.0541 -6.33 0.000 
North Carolina -0.1320 0.0213 -6.19 0.000 
North Dakota -0.2006 0.0318 -6.30 0.000 
Ohio -0.2209 0.0294 -7.52 0.000 
Oklahoma -0.0802 0.0189 -4.25 0.000 
Oregon -0.1608 0.0243 -6.61 0.000 
Pennsylvania -0.1951 0.0340 -5.74 0.000 
Rhode Island -0.1729 0.0317 -5.45 0.000 
South Carolina -0.0606 0.0179 -3.39 0.001 
South Dakota -0.1402 0.0355 -3.95 0.000 
Tennessee -0.1036 0.0227 -4.55 0.000 
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Texas -0.2749 0.0602 -4.57 0.000 
Utah -0.1413 0.0338 -4.18 0.000 
Vermont -0.2292 0.0344 -6.66 0.000 
Virginia -0.1690 0.0290 -5.84 0.000 
Washington -0.2082 0.0276 -7.53 0.000 
West Virginia 0.0496 0.0303 1.64 0.102 
Wisconsin -0.2518 0.0271 -9.28 0.000 
Wyoming -0.1412 0.0350 -4.03 0.000 
2001 0.0010 0.0094 0.11 0.911 
2002 -0.0176 0.0106 -1.66 0.097 
2003 -0.0402 0.0118 -3.42 0.001 
2004 -0.0389 0.0128 -3.05 0.002 
2005 -0.0400 0.0140 -2.85 0.004 
2006 -0.0412 0.0160 -2.58 0.010 
2007 -0.0559 0.0182 -3.07 0.002 
2008 -0.0388 0.0220 -1.77 0.077 
2009 -0.0382 0.0259 -1.47 0.141 
2010 -0.0672 0.0272 -2.47 0.013 
2011 -0.0726 0.0284 -2.56 0.010 
2012 -0.0750 0.0292 -2.57 0.010 
2013 -0.0775 0.0281 -2.75 0.006 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the stand-alone regression of 
the fourth equation with controls and expand vectors, state and year effects. The 
estimation controls for state and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.3.1:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs R-Squared F-Statistic P > | F | 
Tax Rate 686 0.3956 6.46 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
GC 0.0095 0.0052 1.83 0.068 
Percent in Poverty 0.1234 0.1774 0.70 0.487 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the simultaneous regression of 
the first equation without controls. The estimation controls for state and year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 7.3.2:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs R-Squared F-Statistic P > | F | 
Medicaid subsidy 686 0.3593 5.54 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
GC 0.0011 0.0011 0.98 0.326 
Percent in Poverty 0.0238 0.0385 0.62 0.536 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the simultaneous regression of 
the second equation without controls. The estimation controls for state and year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 7.3.2.1:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs R-Squared F-Statistic P > | F | 
Medicaid subsidy 686 0.3593 5.54 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
Alaska -0.0050 0.0050 -0.99 0.324 
Arizona -0.0088 0.0045 -1.97 0.049 
Arkansas -0.0057 0.0045 -1.28 0.202 
California -0.0059 0.0045 -1.31 0.191 
Colorado -0.0038 0.0049 -0.78 0.435 
Connecticut 0.0055 0.0052 1.06 0.288 
Delaware 0.0008 0.0049 0.17 0.867 
Florida 0.0051 0.0046 1.09 0.274 
Georgia -0.0030 0.0045 -0.66 0.509 
Hawaii 0.0031 0.0049 0.62 0.533 
Idaho -0.0064 0.0047 -1.35 0.177 
Illinois 0.0034 0.0047 0.72 0.470 
Indiana 0.0024 0.0047 0.51 0.609 
Iowa 0.0163 0.0050 3.27 0.001 
Kansas -0.0051 0.0047 -1.10 0.272 
Kentucky 0.0082 0.0045 1.82 0.068 
Louisiana -0.0065 0.0046 -1.42 0.155 
Maine -0.0012 0.0047 -0.25 0.803 
Maryland 0.0073 0.0051 1.41 0.158 
Massachusetts 0.0251 0.0049 5.13 0.000 
Michigan 0.0005 0.0046 0.10 0.917 
Minnesota -0.0020 0.0052 -0.38 0.707 
Mississippi -0.0089 0.0048 -1.87 0.061 
Missouri 0.0049 0.0046 1.05 0.292 
Montana -0.0034 0.0045 -0.75 0.452 
Nevada -0.0048 0.0047 -1.03 0.305 
New Hampshire -0.0094 0.0057 -1.64 0.100 
New Jersey -0.0034 0.0052 -0.66 0.507 
New Mexico -0.0099 0.0046 -2.14 0.032 
New York 0.0029 0.0045 0.65 0.515 
North Carolina 0.0037 0.0045 0.82 0.412 
North Dakota -0.0123 0.0049 -2.52 0.012 
Ohio 0.0164 0.0046 3.54 0.000 
Oklahoma -0.0026 0.0045 -0.57 0.571 
Oregon 0.0182 0.0046 3.96 0.000 
Pennsylvania 0.0112 0.0048 2.34 0.019 
Rhode Island -0.0001 0.0047 -0.01 0.989 
South Carolina -0.0059 0.0045 -1.30 0.194 
South Dakota 0.0067 0.0047 1.41 0.159 
Tennessee -0.0121 0.0045 -2.71 0.007 
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Texas 0.0068 0.0045 1.49 0.136 
Utah -0.0072 0.0051 -1.40 0.161 
Vermont -0.0060 0.0051 -1.18 0.237 
Virginia 0.0014 0.0050 0.27 0.784 
Washington -0.0011 0.0048 -0.23 0.820 
West Virginia -0.0059 0.0045 -1.31 0.191 
Wisconsin -0.0017 0.0049 -0.34 0.733 
Wyoming -0.0085 0.0049 -1.73 0.085 
2001 -0.0005 0.0024 -0.22 0.823 
2002 0.0075 0.0024 3.14 0.002 
2003 0.0026 0.0024 1.08 0.279 
2004 -0.0036 0.0024 -1.51 0.130 
2005 -0.0018 0.0024 -0.74 0.459 
2006 -0.0033 0.0024 -1.39 0.165 
2007 0.0007 0.0024 0.28 0.778 
2008 -0.0029 0.0024 -1.19 0.236 
2009 -0.0027 0.0025 -1.07 0.283 
2010 -0.0018 0.0026 -0.72 0.474 
2011 -0.0034 0.0026 -1.30 0.192 
2012 0.0025 0.0026 0.95 0.340 
2013 0.0009 0.0025 0.36 0.718 
2014 -0.0050 0.0050 -0.99 0.324 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the simultaneous regression of 
the second equation without controls, state and year effects. The estimation controls 
for state and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.3.3:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs R-Squared F-Statistic P > | F | 
Healthcare Coverage 686 0.5919 14.07 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
GC 0.0006 0.0043 0.13 0.893 
H in t-1 0.4358 0.0352 12.40 0.000 
h in t-1 0.0115 0.0338 0.34 0.734 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the simultaneous regression of 
the third equation without controls. The estimation controls for state and year fixed 
effects. 
 
  
87 
 
Table 7.3.4:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs R-Squared F-Statistic P > | F | 
Healthcare Coverage 686 0.5919 14.07 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
s -6.8394 7.2589 -0.94 0.346 
h in t-1 0.1341 0.0837 1.60 0.109 
H 0.1739 0.2474 0.70 0.482 
Personal Income -0.0535 0.1422 -0.38 0.707 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the simultaneous regression of 
the fourth equation without controls. The estimation controls for state and year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 7.3.4.1:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs R-Squared F-Statistic P > | F | 
Bad Health 686 -0.0998 6.02 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
Alaska -0.1836 0.0506 -3.63 0.000 
Arizona -0.2475 0.0529 -4.68 0.000 
Arkansas -0.0876 0.0466 -1.88 0.060 
California -0.2089 0.0545 -3.83 0.000 
Colorado -0.1566 0.0463 -3.38 0.001 
Connecticut -0.1309 0.1175 -1.11 0.265 
Delaware -0.1773 0.0577 -3.08 0.002 
Florida -0.0770 0.0795 -0.97 0.333 
Georgia -0.1210 0.0389 -3.11 0.002 
Hawaii -0.1838 0.0580 -3.17 0.002 
Idaho -0.2077 0.0521 -3.98 0.000 
Illinois -0.1709 0.0748 -2.28 0.022 
Indiana -0.1407 0.0451 -3.12 0.002 
Iowa -0.0859 0.1505 -0.57 0.568 
Kansas -0.1289 0.0436 -2.96 0.003 
Kentucky 0.0230 0.0680 0.34 0.735 
Louisiana -0.1202 0.0497 -2.42 0.016 
Maine -0.1726 0.0423 -4.08 0.000 
Maryland -0.0506 0.1202 -0.42 0.674 
Massachusetts -0.0151 0.2345 -0.06 0.949 
Michigan -0.1499 0.0418 -3.59 0.000 
Minnesota -0.2649 0.0499 -5.31 0.000 
Mississippi -0.0983 0.0748 -1.31 0.189 
Missouri -0.0910 0.0665 -1.37 0.172 
Montana -0.1534 0.0411 -3.74 0.000 
Nevada -0.1885 0.0442 -4.26 0.000 
New Hampshire -0.2283 0.0658 -3.47 0.001 
New Jersey -0.1726 0.0626 -2.76 0.006 
New Mexico -0.2241 0.0685 -3.27 0.001 
New York -0.1621 0.0797 -2.04 0.042 
North Carolina -0.0487 0.0642 -0.76 0.448 
North Dakota -0.2952 0.0719 -4.11 0.000 
Ohio -0.0459 0.1376 -0.33 0.739 
Oklahoma -0.0891 0.0401 -2.22 0.026 
Oregon -0.0315 0.1662 -0.19 0.850 
Pennsylvania -0.0484 0.0949 -0.51 0.610 
Rhode Island -0.1950 0.0519 -3.75 0.000 
South Carolina -0.0868 0.0491 -1.77 0.077 
South Dakota -0.1212 0.0900 -1.35 0.178 
Tennessee -0.1790 0.0949 -1.89 0.059 
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Texas -0.0375 0.1015 -0.37 0.712 
Utah -0.2424 0.0559 -4.33 0.000 
Vermont -0.2680 0.0481 -5.57 0.000 
Virginia -0.0965 0.0634 -1.52 0.128 
Washington -0.1802 0.0527 -3.42 0.001 
West Virginia -0.0166 0.0601 -0.28 0.782 
Wisconsin -0.2372 0.0471 -5.03 0.000 
Wyoming -0.2076 0.0545 -3.81 0.000 
2001 -0.1836 0.0506 -3.63 0.000 
2002 -0.2475 0.0529 -4.68 0.000 
2003 -0.0876 0.0466 -1.88 0.060 
2004 -0.2089 0.0545 -3.83 0.000 
2005 -0.1566 0.0463 -3.38 0.001 
2006 -0.1309 0.1175 -1.11 0.265 
2007 -0.1773 0.0577 -3.08 0.002 
2008 -0.0770 0.0795 -0.97 0.333 
2009 -0.1210 0.0389 -3.11 0.002 
2010 -0.1838 0.0580 -3.17 0.002 
2011 -0.2077 0.0521 -3.98 0.000 
2012 -0.1709 0.0748 -2.28 0.022 
2013 -0.1407 0.0451 -3.12 0.002 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the simultaneous regression of 
the fourth equation without controls, state and year effects. The estimation controls 
for state and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.3.5: Combined simultaneous regression output of all equations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES taxrate caidtax healthcoverage badhealthcaid 
     
GC 0.010* 0.001 0.001  
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.004)  
percent enrolled in medicaid as a faction 
of ellibile people for medicaid = L, 
  0.436***  
   (0.035)  
(mean) badhealth = L,   0.011 0.134 
   (0.034) (0.084) 
State (FIPS code) = 2, Alaska -0.030 -0.005 -0.029 -0.184*** 
 (0.023) (0.005) (0.018) (0.051) 
State (FIPS code) = 4, Arizona -0.049** -0.009** -0.044** -0.247*** 
 (0.021) (0.004) (0.019) (0.053) 
State (FIPS code) = 5, Arkansas -0.016 -0.006 -0.047*** -0.088* 
 (0.021) (0.004) (0.017) (0.047) 
State (FIPS code) = 6, California -0.028 -0.006 -0.064*** -0.209*** 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.019) (0.055) 
State (FIPS code) = 8, Colorado -0.038* -0.004 -0.017 -0.157*** 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.018) (0.046) 
State (FIPS code) = 9, Connecticut -0.030 0.006 0.008 -0.131 
 (0.024) (0.005) (0.019) (0.117) 
State (FIPS code) = 10, Delaware 0.004 0.001 0.013 -0.177*** 
 (0.023) (0.005) (0.018) (0.058) 
State (FIPS code) = 12, Florida 0.014 0.005 -0.016 -0.077 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.018) (0.080) 
State (FIPS code) = 13, Georgia -0.015 -0.003 -0.016 -0.121*** 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.018) (0.039) 
State (FIPS code) = 15, Hawaii 0.090*** 0.003 0.044** -0.184*** 
 (0.023) (0.005) (0.019) (0.058) 
State (FIPS code) = 16, Idaho -0.027 -0.006 -0.025 -0.208*** 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.018) (0.052) 
State (FIPS code) = 17, Illinois -0.004 0.003 0.004 -0.171** 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.019) (0.075) 
State (FIPS code) = 18, Indiana 0.039* 0.002 0.008 -0.141*** 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.018) (0.045) 
State (FIPS code) = 19, Iowa 0.077*** 0.016*** -0.029 -0.086 
 (0.023) (0.005) (0.019) (0.150) 
State (FIPS code) = 20, Kansas -0.018 -0.005 -0.013 -0.129*** 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.017) (0.044) 
State (FIPS code) = 21, Kentucky 0.072*** 0.008* 0.006 0.023 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.017) (0.068) 
State (FIPS code) = 22, Louisiana -0.039* -0.007 0.000 -0.120** 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.017) (0.050) 
State (FIPS code) = 23, Maine -0.026 -0.001 -0.005 -0.173*** 
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 (0.022) (0.005) (0.018) (0.042) 
State (FIPS code) = 24, Maryland 0.039 0.007 -0.050*** -0.051 
 (0.024) (0.005) (0.018) (0.120) 
State (FIPS code) = 25, Massachusetts 0.043* 0.025*** 0.018 -0.015 
 (0.023) (0.005) (0.019) (0.234) 
State (FIPS code) = 26, Michigan 0.007 0.000 0.020 -0.150*** 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.018) (0.042) 
State (FIPS code) = 27, Minnesota -0.010 -0.002 0.013 -0.265*** 
 (0.024) (0.005) (0.020) (0.050) 
State (FIPS code) = 28, Mississippi -0.048** -0.009* -0.005 -0.098 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.017) (0.075) 
State (FIPS code) = 29, Missouri -0.020 0.005 -0.014 -0.091 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.018) (0.067) 
State (FIPS code) = 30, Montana 0.017 -0.003 -0.009 -0.153*** 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.018) (0.041) 
State (FIPS code) = 32, Nevada 0.004 -0.005 -0.025 -0.189*** 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.018) (0.044) 
State (FIPS code) = 33, New Hampshire -0.070*** -0.009 0.009 -0.228*** 
 (0.026) (0.006) (0.018) (0.066) 
State (FIPS code) = 34, New Jersey -0.025 -0.003 0.006 -0.173*** 
 (0.024) (0.005) (0.018) (0.063) 
State (FIPS code) = 35, New Mexico -0.054** -0.010** -0.007 -0.224*** 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.018) (0.068) 
State (FIPS code) = 36, New York 0.001 0.003 0.027 -0.162** 
 (0.021) (0.004) (0.018) (0.080) 
State (FIPS code) = 37, North Carolina 0.018 0.004 -0.020 -0.049 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.018) (0.064) 
State (FIPS code) = 38, North Dakota -0.070*** -0.012** -0.017 -0.295*** 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.019) (0.072) 
State (FIPS code) = 39, Ohio -0.019 0.016*** 0.017 -0.046 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.018) (0.138) 
State (FIPS code) = 40, Oklahoma -0.005 -0.003 -0.047*** -0.089** 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.017) (0.040) 
State (FIPS code) = 41, Oregon 0.088*** 0.018*** -0.038** -0.032 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.018) (0.166) 
State (FIPS code) = 42, Pennsylvania 0.008 0.011** 0.068*** -0.048 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.018) (0.095) 
State (FIPS code) = 44, Rhode Island -0.038* -0.000 0.013 -0.195*** 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.019) (0.052) 
State (FIPS code) = 45, South Carolina -0.036* -0.006 -0.021 -0.087* 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.017) (0.049) 
State (FIPS code) = 46, South Dakota 0.032 0.007 -0.016 -0.121 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.019) (0.090) 
State (FIPS code) = 47, Tennessee -0.081*** -0.012*** 0.030* -0.179* 
 (0.021) (0.004) (0.018) (0.095) 
State (FIPS code) = 48, Texas 0.023 0.007 -0.050*** -0.038 
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 (0.021) (0.005) (0.018) (0.102) 
State (FIPS code) = 49, Utah -0.011 -0.007 -0.035* -0.242*** 
 (0.024) (0.005) (0.019) (0.056) 
State (FIPS code) = 50, Vermont -0.038 -0.006 -0.036* -0.268*** 
 (0.023) (0.005) (0.019) (0.048) 
State (FIPS code) = 51, Virginia 0.018 0.001 -0.015 -0.096 
 (0.023) (0.005) (0.018) (0.063) 
State (FIPS code) = 53, Washington -0.011 -0.001 0.005 -0.180*** 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.018) (0.053) 
State (FIPS code) = 54, West Virginia -0.018 -0.006 0.008 -0.017 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.017) (0.060) 
State (FIPS code) = 55, Wisconsin 0.004 -0.002 -0.017 -0.237*** 
 (0.023) (0.005) (0.019) (0.047) 
State (FIPS code) = 56, Wyoming -0.025 -0.009* -0.019 -0.208*** 
 (0.023) (0.005) (0.018) (0.055) 
Survey year = 2001 -0.013 -0.001 0.013 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.020) 
Survey year = 2002 0.010 0.008*** 0.008 0.032 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.060) 
Survey year = 2003 -0.008 0.003 0.001 -0.029 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.033) 
Survey year = 2004 -0.047*** -0.004 -0.018* -0.050** 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.025) 
Survey year = 2005 -0.038*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.033 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.027) 
Survey year = 2006 -0.045*** -0.003 -0.011 -0.036 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.030) 
Survey year = 2007 -0.023** 0.001 -0.008 -0.014 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.050) 
Survey year = 2008 -0.045*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.011 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.040) 
Survey year = 2009 -0.046*** -0.003 0.010 -0.025 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.035) 
Survey year = 2010 -0.040*** -0.002 0.012 -0.042 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.009) (0.041) 
Survey year = 2011 -0.051*** -0.003 -0.011 -0.049 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.009) (0.045) 
Survey year = 2012 -0.028** 0.002 -0.018* 0.008 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.009) (0.082) 
Survey year = 2013 -0.036*** 0.001 -0.012 0.001 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.009) (0.073) 
% In Poverty 0.123 0.024   
 (0.177) (0.039)   
caidtax    -6.839 
    (7.259) 
percent enrolled in medicaid as a faction    0.174 
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of ellibile people for medicaid 
    (0.247) 
lnpersinc    -0.054 
    (0.142) 
Constant 0.098*** 0.011 0.420*** 0.983 
 (0.031) (0.007) (0.035) (1.409) 
     
Observations 686 686 686 686 
R-squared 0.396 0.359 0.592 -0.100 
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This table contains the complete results for the simultaneous regression of all four 
equations as described in the third iteration of the model. This table holds the 
coefficients and standard errors for all variables and fixed effects that appear in all of 
the models. The constants which are statistically significant are indicated by asterisk 
which denote the constant’s level of statistical significance. The estimation controls 
for state and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.4.1:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs R-Squared F-Statistic P > | F | 
Tax Rate 686 0.8164 18.76 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
Medicaid subsidy 2.6331 1.3300 1.98 0.048 
Schoolchildren Average -0.0333 0.0419 -0.79 0.428 
GC 0.0069 0.0033 2.09 0.037 
Percent in Poverty -0.0211 0.1063 -0.20 0.842 
Gini -0.0102 0.0884 -0.11 0.909 
Unemployment Rate 0.0038 0.0023 1.63 0.103 
Young 0.0430 0.1004 0.43 0.669 
Old -0.0285 0.1029 -0.28 0.782 
% Male 0.0983 0.1736 0.57 0.571 
% White 0.0779 0.0722 1.08 0.281 
Population -0.0012 0.0036 -0.34 0.734 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the simultaneous regression of 
the first equation with controls. The estimation controls for state and year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 7.4.2:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs R-Squared F-Statistic P > | F | 
Medicaid subsidy 686 0.8287 18.01 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
Tax Rate 0.2486 0.0797 3.12 0.002 
GC -0.0013 0.0009 -1.40 0.160 
Percent in Poverty 0.0027 0.0218 0.12 0.901 
Gini 0.0020 0.0183 0.11 0.912 
Unemployment Rate -0.0005 0.0006 -0.74 0.460 
Young -0.0125 0.0210 -0.59 0.552 
Old -0.0034 0.0185 -0.18 0.856 
% Male -0.0145 0.0377 -0.39 0.700 
% White -0.0209 0.0157 -1.33 0.182 
Population 0.0006 0.0007 0.84 0.403 
Medicaid Expansion -0.0031 0.0033 -0.94 0.348 
Interaction of GC and ME 0.0014 0.0039 0.35 0.724 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the simultaneous regression of 
the second equation with controls. The estimation controls for state and year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 7.4.2.1:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs R-Squared F-Statistic P > | F | 
Medicaid subsidy 686 0.8287 18.01 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
Alaska 0.0075 0.0060 1.25 0.211 
Arizona 0.0074 0.0069 1.06 0.290 
Arkansas 0.0019 0.0038 0.50 0.615 
California -0.0145 0.0241 -0.60 0.546 
Colorado 0.0108 0.0066 1.64 0.101 
Connecticut 0.0176 0.0052 3.37 0.001 
Delaware 0.0035 0.0039 0.88 0.376 
Florida -0.0036 0.0105 -0.34 0.732 
Georgia -0.0027 0.0044 -0.61 0.541 
Hawaii -0.0265 0.0122 -2.17 0.030 
Idaho 0.0088 0.0069 1.28 0.199 
Illinois 0.0026 0.0071 0.37 0.714 
Indiana -0.0036 0.0044 -0.83 0.406 
Iowa 0.0037 0.0066 0.57 0.572 
Kansas 0.0049 0.0049 1.00 0.320 
Kentucky -0.0042 0.0057 -0.73 0.464 
Louisiana 0.0022 0.0035 0.62 0.535 
Maine 0.0134 0.0066 2.03 0.043 
Maryland -0.0037 0.0043 -0.87 0.386 
Massachusetts 0.0172 0.0046 3.74 0.000 
Michigan -0.0007 0.0053 -0.13 0.894 
Minnesota 0.0056 0.0050 1.12 0.261 
Mississippi 0.0022 0.0045 0.48 0.631 
Missouri 0.0132 0.0048 2.73 0.006 
Montana -0.0005 0.0050 -0.10 0.921 
Nevada -0.0004 0.0041 -0.10 0.921 
New Hampshire 0.0157 0.0090 1.75 0.081 
New Jersey 0.0037 0.0055 0.67 0.502 
New Mexico 0.0086 0.0062 1.40 0.161 
New York -0.0051 0.0112 -0.46 0.649 
North Carolina -0.0020 0.0041 -0.49 0.624 
North Dakota 0.0116 0.0080 1.46 0.143 
Ohio 0.0210 0.0070 2.99 0.003 
Oklahoma 0.0005 0.0028 0.18 0.854 
Oregon 0.0027 0.0061 0.44 0.660 
Pennsylvania 0.0085 0.0071 1.20 0.231 
Rhode Island 0.0166 0.0068 2.44 0.015 
South Carolina 0.0035 0.0042 0.83 0.406 
South Dakota 0.0051 0.0052 0.97 0.331 
Tennessee 0.0104 0.0083 1.25 0.211 
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Texas -0.0069 0.0147 -0.47 0.638 
Utah 0.0034 0.0062 0.55 0.583 
Vermont 0.0115 0.0071 1.61 0.107 
Virginia -0.0043 0.0038 -1.11 0.268 
Washington 0.0053 0.0048 1.10 0.273 
West Virginia 0.0060 0.0057 1.04 0.298 
Wisconsin 0.0022 0.0047 0.46 0.645 
Wyoming 0.0063 0.0067 0.94 0.345 
2001 0.0020 0.0019 1.08 0.281 
2002 0.0047 0.0016 2.96 0.003 
2003 0.0042 0.0020 2.10 0.036 
2004 0.0074 0.0043 1.73 0.083 
2005 0.0067 0.0034 1.95 0.051 
2006 0.0066 0.0037 1.78 0.076 
2007 0.0051 0.0022 2.28 0.023 
2008 0.0076 0.0043 1.79 0.074 
2009 0.0094 0.0060 1.56 0.118 
2010 0.0086 0.0056 1.54 0.124 
2011 0.0095 0.0059 1.61 0.107 
2012 0.0092 0.0038 2.42 0.016 
2013 0.0095 0.0040 2.34 0.020 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the simultaneous regression of 
the second equation with controls, state and year effects. The estimation controls for 
state and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.4.3:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs R-Squared F-Statistic P > | F | 
Healthcare Coverage 686 0.6021 12.68 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
GC 0.0005 0.0044 0.11 0.908 
H in t-1 0.4274 0.0352 12.13 0.000 
h in t-1 0.0054 0.0341 0.16 0.873 
Gini -0.1016 0.1287 -0.79 0.430 
Unemployment Rate -0.0025 0.0023 -1.08 0.278 
Young -0.0574 0.1374 -0.42 0.676 
Old 0.2898 0.1338 2.17 0.030 
% Male -0.0754 0.2480 -0.30 0.761 
% White 0.0641 0.1066 0.60 0.548 
Population 0.0072 0.0053 1.34 0.180 
Medicaid Expansion 0.0088 0.0229 0.38 0.701 
Interaction of GC and ME 0.0280 0.0277 1.01 0.313 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the simultaneous regression of 
the third equation with controls. The estimation controls for state and year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 7.4.4:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs R-Squared F-Statistic P > | F | 
Bad Health 686 0.5275 12.42 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
s 3.1612 4.2755 0.74 0.460 
H 0.0601 0.0578 1.04 0.298 
h in t-1 -0.1225 0.1684 -0.73 0.467 
Personal Income -0.0027 0.0857 -0.03 0.975 
Gini 0.0228 0.1861 0.12 0.903 
Unemployment Rate -0.0089 0.0076 -1.18 0.239 
Young -0.3570 0.2082 -1.72 0.086 
Old 0.2799 0.2135 1.31 0.190 
% Male 0.0652 0.3712 0.18 0.860 
% White -0.0098 0.1543 -0.06 0.949 
Population 0.0072 0.0077 0.94 0.348 
Medicaid Expansion 0.0053 0.0267 0.20 0.843 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the simultaneous regression of 
the fourth equation with controls. The estimation controls for state and year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 7.4.4.1:  
 
Dependent Variable Number of Obs R-Squared F-Statistic P > | F | 
Bad Health 686 0.5275 12.42 0.000 
Independent Variable Coefficient Stand. Error Z Score P > |Z| 
Alaska -0.1238 0.0530 -2.34 0.020 
Arizona -0.1962 0.0493 -3.98 0.000 
Arkansas -0.0412 0.0348 -1.18 0.237 
California -0.4089 0.2537 -1.61 0.107 
Colorado -0.1374 0.0490 -2.80 0.005 
Connecticut -0.2195 0.0694 -3.16 0.002 
Delaware -0.1781 0.0464 -3.83 0.000 
Florida -0.2572 0.1106 -2.33 0.020 
Georgia -0.1323 0.0478 -2.77 0.006 
Hawaii -0.2115 0.0785 -2.69 0.007 
Idaho -0.1267 0.0548 -2.31 0.021 
Illinois -0.2695 0.0738 -3.65 0.000 
Indiana -0.1782 0.0450 -3.96 0.000 
Iowa -0.2683 0.1071 -2.51 0.012 
Kansas -0.0739 0.0430 -1.72 0.086 
Kentucky -0.0386 0.0555 -0.70 0.487 
Louisiana -0.0667 0.0338 -1.98 0.048 
Maine -0.1736 0.0594 -2.92 0.003 
Maryland -0.1939 0.0590 -3.28 0.001 
Massachusetts -0.3077 0.1228 -2.51 0.012 
Michigan -0.1770 0.0560 -3.16 0.002 
Minnesota -0.2591 0.0485 -5.35 0.000 
Mississippi 0.0008 0.0487 0.02 0.986 
Missouri -0.1581 0.0472 -3.35 0.001 
Montana -0.1229 0.0520 -2.37 0.018 
Nevada -0.1280 0.0457 -2.80 0.005 
New Hampshire -0.1474 0.0652 -2.26 0.024 
New Jersey -0.1976 0.0607 -3.26 0.001 
New Mexico -0.1362 0.0440 -3.09 0.002 
New York -0.3092 0.1202 -2.57 0.010 
North Carolina -0.1374 0.0463 -2.97 0.003 
North Dakota -0.1921 0.0549 -3.50 0.000 
Ohio -0.2609 0.0904 -2.89 0.004 
Oklahoma -0.0925 0.0317 -2.92 0.004 
Oregon -0.2299 0.0991 -2.32 0.020 
Pennsylvania -0.1998 0.0799 -2.50 0.012 
Rhode Island -0.1739 0.0538 -3.23 0.001 
South Carolina -0.0439 0.0336 -1.31 0.191 
South Dakota -0.1990 0.0774 -2.57 0.010 
Tennessee -0.0534 0.0676 -0.79 0.430 
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Texas -0.2745 0.1547 -1.77 0.076 
Utah -0.1470 0.0545 -2.70 0.007 
Vermont -0.2451 0.0613 -4.00 0.000 
Virginia -0.1662 0.0440 -3.78 0.000 
Washington -0.1905 0.0458 -4.16 0.000 
West Virginia 0.0466 0.0527 0.88 0.376 
Wisconsin -0.2545 0.0478 -5.32 0.000 
Wyoming -0.1338 0.0610 -2.19 0.028 
2001 0.0112 0.0207 0.54 0.586 
2002 -0.0242 0.0257 -0.94 0.347 
2003 -0.0419 0.0202 -2.07 0.039 
2004 -0.0199 0.0312 -0.64 0.524 
2005 -0.0242 0.0275 -0.88 0.379 
2006 -0.0217 0.0321 -0.68 0.498 
2007 -0.0466 0.0292 -1.60 0.110 
2008 -0.0038 0.0421 -0.09 0.929 
2009 0.0132 0.0604 0.22 0.827 
2010 -0.0117 0.0608 -0.19 0.848 
2011 -0.0251 0.0595 -0.42 0.673 
2012 -0.0455 0.0473 -0.96 0.336 
2013 -0.0458 0.0460 -1.00 0.319 
 
Table contains: variables, observations, model statistics, model probabilities, 
coefficients, standard errors, z scores and P-values for the simultaneous regression of 
the fourth equation with controls, state and year effects. The estimation controls for 
state and year fixed effects. 
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Table 7.4.5: Combined simultaneous regression output of all equations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES taxrate caidtax healthcoverage badhealthcaid 
     
(mean) taxrate  0.249***   
  (0.080)   
GC 0.007** -0.001 0.001  
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)  
% In Poverty -0.021 0.003   
 (0.106) (0.022)   
ginccaid -0.010 0.002 -0.102 0.023 
 (0.088) (0.018) (0.129) (0.186) 
Unemployment Rate 0.004 -0.000 -0.002 -0.009 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) 
young 0.043 -0.013 -0.057 -0.357* 
 (0.100) (0.021) (0.137) (0.208) 
old -0.029 -0.003 0.290** 0.280 
 (0.103) (0.019) (0.134) (0.214) 
fracmale 0.098 -0.015 -0.075 0.065 
 (0.174) (0.038) (0.248) (0.371) 
fracwhite 0.078 -0.021 0.064 -0.010 
 (0.072) (0.016) (0.107) (0.154) 
popmil -0.001 0.001 0.007 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) 
caidexp  -0.003 0.009 0.005 
  (0.003) (0.023) (0.027) 
intgcexp  0.001 0.028  
  (0.004) (0.028)  
State (FIPS code) = 2, Alaska -0.034 0.008 0.003 -0.124** 
 (0.022) (0.006) (0.029) (0.053) 
State (FIPS code) = 4, Arizona -0.041* 0.007 -0.056* -0.196*** 
 (0.024) (0.007) (0.031) (0.049) 
State (FIPS code) = 5, Arkansas -0.012 0.002 -0.041* -0.041 
 (0.017) (0.004) (0.024) (0.035) 
State (FIPS code) = 6, California 0.012 -0.015 -0.285* -0.409 
 (0.119) (0.024) (0.171) (0.254) 
State (FIPS code) = 8, Colorado -0.050** 0.011 -0.021 -0.137*** 
 (0.022) (0.007) (0.031) (0.049) 
State (FIPS code) = 9, Connecticut -0.058*** 0.018*** -0.002 -0.219*** 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.028) (0.069) 
State (FIPS code) = 10, Delaware -0.007 0.003 0.031 -0.178*** 
 (0.019) (0.004) (0.028) (0.046) 
State (FIPS code) = 12, Florida 0.004 -0.004 -0.120 -0.257** 
 (0.051) (0.010) (0.076) (0.111) 
State (FIPS code) = 13, Georgia -0.001 -0.003 -0.035 -0.132*** 
 (0.022) (0.004) (0.031) (0.048) 
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State (FIPS code) = 15, Hawaii 0.114*** -0.027** 0.086 -0.211*** 
 (0.038) (0.012) (0.055) (0.079) 
State (FIPS code) = 16, Idaho -0.034 0.009 -0.010 -0.127** 
 (0.028) (0.007) (0.039) (0.055) 
State (FIPS code) = 17, Illinois -0.016 0.003 -0.048 -0.269*** 
 (0.033) (0.007) (0.049) (0.074) 
State (FIPS code) = 18, Indiana 0.019 -0.004 -0.016 -0.178*** 
 (0.021) (0.004) (0.030) (0.045) 
State (FIPS code) = 19, Iowa 0.014 0.004 -0.032 -0.268** 
 (0.034) (0.007) (0.035) (0.107) 
State (FIPS code) = 20, Kansas -0.021 0.005 -0.006 -0.074* 
 (0.020) (0.005) (0.029) (0.043) 
State (FIPS code) = 21, Kentucky 0.029 -0.004 0.003 -0.039 
 (0.023) (0.006) (0.030) (0.055) 
State (FIPS code) = 22, Louisiana -0.014 0.002 0.003 -0.067** 
 (0.014) (0.003) (0.018) (0.034) 
State (FIPS code) = 23, Maine -0.049* 0.013** -0.007 -0.174*** 
 (0.027) (0.007) (0.040) (0.059) 
State (FIPS code) = 24, Maryland 0.024 -0.004 -0.061*** -0.194*** 
 (0.016) (0.004) (0.020) (0.059) 
State (FIPS code) = 25, Massachusetts -0.034 0.017*** -0.005 -0.308** 
 (0.038) (0.005) (0.029) (0.123) 
State (FIPS code) = 26, Michigan -0.004 -0.001 -0.016 -0.177*** 
 (0.025) (0.005) (0.037) (0.056) 
State (FIPS code) = 27, Minnesota -0.021 0.006 -0.002 -0.259*** 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.032) (0.048) 
State (FIPS code) = 28, Mississippi -0.018 0.002 0.014 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.005) (0.022) (0.049) 
State (FIPS code) = 29, Missouri -0.047** 0.013*** -0.028 -0.158*** 
 (0.019) (0.005) (0.027) (0.047) 
State (FIPS code) = 30, Montana 0.005 -0.000 -0.007 -0.123** 
 (0.024) (0.005) (0.036) (0.052) 
State (FIPS code) = 32, Nevada -0.005 -0.000 -0.009 -0.128*** 
 (0.020) (0.004) (0.026) (0.046) 
State (FIPS code) = 33, New 
Hampshire 
-0.068** 0.016* 0.010 -0.147** 
 (0.029) (0.009) (0.039) (0.065) 
State (FIPS code) = 34, New Jersey -0.021 0.004 -0.026 -0.198*** 
 (0.023) (0.006) (0.032) (0.061) 
State (FIPS code) = 35, New Mexico -0.040* 0.009 -0.003 -0.136*** 
 (0.021) (0.006) (0.029) (0.044) 
State (FIPS code) = 36, New York 0.008 -0.005 -0.076 -0.309** 
 (0.054) (0.011) (0.081) (0.120) 
State (FIPS code) = 37, North Carolina 0.006 -0.002 -0.049 -0.137*** 
 (0.020) (0.004) (0.030) (0.046) 
State (FIPS code) = 38, North Dakota -0.054** 0.012 -0.005 -0.192*** 
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 (0.026) (0.008) (0.037) (0.055) 
State (FIPS code) = 39, Ohio -0.070** 0.021*** -0.040 -0.261*** 
 (0.034) (0.007) (0.045) (0.090) 
State (FIPS code) = 40, Oklahoma -0.001 0.001 -0.045** -0.093*** 
 (0.014) (0.003) (0.020) (0.032) 
State (FIPS code) = 41, Oregon 0.013 0.003 -0.040 -0.230** 
 (0.030) (0.006) (0.030) (0.099) 
State (FIPS code) = 42, Pennsylvania -0.026 0.008 0.000 -0.200** 
 (0.035) (0.007) (0.051) (0.080) 
State (FIPS code) = 44, Rhode Island -0.062*** 0.017** 0.027 -0.174*** 
 (0.023) (0.007) (0.034) (0.054) 
State (FIPS code) = 45, South Carolina -0.024 0.003 -0.022 -0.044 
 (0.016) (0.004) (0.018) (0.034) 
State (FIPS code) = 46, South Dakota -0.000 0.005 -0.001 -0.199** 
 (0.029) (0.005) (0.036) (0.077) 
State (FIPS code) = 47, Tennessee -0.061** 0.010 0.017 -0.053 
 (0.024) (0.008) (0.025) (0.068) 
State (FIPS code) = 48, Texas 0.017 -0.007 -0.182* -0.274* 
 (0.071) (0.015) (0.107) (0.155) 
State (FIPS code) = 49, Utah -0.012 0.003 -0.014 -0.147*** 
 (0.029) (0.006) (0.038) (0.055) 
State (FIPS code) = 50, Vermont -0.045 0.011 -0.042 -0.245*** 
 (0.028) (0.007) (0.042) (0.061) 
State (FIPS code) = 51, Virginia 0.016 -0.004 -0.039 -0.166*** 
 (0.018) (0.004) (0.026) (0.044) 
State (FIPS code) = 53, Washington -0.026 0.005 -0.016 -0.191*** 
 (0.020) (0.005) (0.028) (0.046) 
State (FIPS code) = 54, West Virginia -0.025 0.006 0.000 0.047 
 (0.025) (0.006) (0.037) (0.053) 
State (FIPS code) = 55, Wisconsin -0.011 0.002 -0.035 -0.255*** 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.032) (0.048) 
State (FIPS code) = 56, Wyoming -0.028 0.006 -0.012 -0.134** 
 (0.028) (0.007) (0.041) (0.061) 
Survey year = 2001 -0.008 0.002 0.026** 0.011 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.011) (0.021) 
Survey year = 2002 -0.009 0.005*** 0.020* -0.024 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) (0.026) 
Survey year = 2003 -0.014* 0.004** 0.011 -0.042** 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.011) (0.020) 
Survey year = 2004 -0.035*** 0.007* -0.011 -0.020 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.011) (0.031) 
Survey year = 2005 -0.029*** 0.007* 0.002 -0.024 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.011) (0.028) 
Survey year = 2006 -0.030*** 0.007* -0.011 -0.022 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.011) (0.032) 
Survey year = 2007 -0.018** 0.005** -0.012 -0.047 
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 (0.008) (0.002) (0.011) (0.029) 
Survey year = 2008 -0.035*** 0.008* -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.012) (0.042) 
Survey year = 2009 -0.047*** 0.009 0.013 0.013 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.016) (0.060) 
Survey year = 2010 -0.043*** 0.009 0.016 -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.016) (0.061) 
Survey year = 2011 -0.047*** 0.010 -0.016 -0.025 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.016) (0.059) 
Survey year = 2012 -0.036*** 0.009** -0.027* -0.046 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.015) (0.047) 
Survey year = 2013 -0.037*** 0.009** -0.024 -0.046 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.015) (0.046) 
caidtax 2.633**   3.161 
 (1.330)   (4.275) 
(mean) schoolkid -0.033    
 (0.042)    
percent enrolled in medicaid as a 
faction of ellibile people for medicaid 
= L, 
  0.427***  
   (0.035)  
(mean) badhealth = L,   0.005 0.060 
   (0.034) (0.058) 
percent enrolled in medicaid as a 
faction of ellibile people for medicaid 
   -0.122 
    (0.168) 
lnpersinc    -0.003 
    (0.086) 
Constant -0.010 0.010 0.386** 0.577 
 (0.124) (0.024) (0.172) (0.908) 
     
Observations 686 686 686 686 
R-squared 0.816 0.829 0.602 0.527 
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This table contains the complete results for the simultaneous regression of all four 
equations as described in the third iteration of the model. This table holds the 
coefficients and standard errors for all variables and fixed effects that appear in all of 
the models. The constants which are statistically significant are indicated by asterisk 
which denote the constant’s level of statistical significance. The estimation accounts 
for state and year fixed effects. 
